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INTRODUCTION

Law and jurisprudence in the United States have always included a
third sovereign, the American Indian tribes.' The federal government and
the states, the other two sovereigns, and their relations with the indigenous
nations do not comprise the content of the legal dialogue. The law and
jurisprudence developed by the Indian nations to serve their needs as
self-governing political states continues the evolution which predated the
European invasion of the Americas. The multiplying interactions among
the sovereigns and the increasing exercise of sovereign power by the

American Indian nations have intensified the need for non-Indians to
learn and appreciate tribal customary law.
* Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. B.A., M.A., Oklahoma State
University; J.D. Harvard Law School. The author appreciates the encouragement provided by Philip
S. Deloria, Leslie Espinoza, Vicki Limas, Kirke Kickingbird, Arvo Q. Mikkanen, Margaret Montoya,
Michael Olivas, James Ronda, Judith Royster, Antoinette Sedillo-Lopez, Gerald Torres, Robert J.
Williams, Jr., Robert J. Weber, and the members of the Oklahoma Indian Bar Association. Their
insights enriched me; of course, the views expressed are my responsibility. Assistance was provided
by student researchers Suzanne Berry, Ken Factor, and Shannon Oliver.
I. The term "American Indian" includes American Indians and Alaskan Natives for the purposes
of this paper. Alaskan Natives, Aleuts, Inuits, and others maintain distinct cultural identities. These
distinctions are not pursttd in this discussion of American Indian law and law school practices.
The term "tribe" is also used for general discussion though the indigenous nations use varied terms
for their collective identity, e.g., nation, pueblo, band, community, rancheria, colony, and village.
The most recent listing of "entities" that are federally recognized demonstrates the variety of selfdesignations used by the indigenous nations. See Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993). Also, Native
Hawaiians comprise an indigenous people whose status evokes issues and doctrines from American
Indian jurisprudence. See Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921),
which established a land trust for the rehabilitation of Hawaiian Natives, subsequently amended
and incorporated into the constitution of the state of Hawaii; see also FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S.
COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 797-810 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
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The focus of this paper is the development of American Indian law
derived from custom, especially common law, among the indigenous
nations. 2 Three major areas will be addressed.
First, the American Indian tribes, as the third sovereign, present a
legal need and opportunity distinguished from other minority groups.
The development of Indian law is tied to the exercise of sovereign power
by the Indian nations. Because the concepts and law produced by the
Indian nations contribute to American jurisprudence and comparative
law, perspectives from Indian law can help resolve doctrinal conflicts of
other sovereigns.
Second, the tribal courts are where the tribal government's legitimacy
is challenged and demonstrated. Only the judicial branch can create tribal
common law. The tribal courts must evoke respect and obedience from
members and nonmembers. Yet, common law is dependent on the customary beliefs and regularized conduct of the tribal community. AngloAmerican law also developed from custom, that is, generally held beliefs
and conduct in compliance with beliefs. It is the culturally different
perspective, not process, that distinguishes the common law created in
tribal courts. Whether the similarity of process is a universal or coincidental evolution is collateral to this study of the tribal common law.
A review of selected cases, from various tribal courts, reveals the use
of indigenous custom and its complementary use with the knowledge
provided by Anglo-American law training. The cases apply concepts of
justice and fairness. The tribal cases reveal indigenous concepts and
institutions borrowed from tribal systems and then established in AngloAmerican law, specifically, alternative dispute resolution. The guiding
principles used in the selected cases sometimes result in outcomes similar
to those in non-Indian jurisdictions. Conversely, other outcomes will be
different because of the Indian cultural viewpoint involved. The reasoning
process reveals how the tribal custom and common law, to be understood,
require an inquiry without stereotypic expectations.
Third, the development of Indian law based on custom is the engine
for innovation. The pervasive ability to change, in order to survive and
maintain continuity, is the cultural characteristic of the indigenous people
of the Americas. American Indian tribes have retained the capacity to
integrate external concepts, technology, and life forms. Through adoption,
'adaptation, and appropriation the acceptance results in new meaning and
value specific to tribal culture. The simultaneous pursuit of conservation
and innovation is the historic pattern of native cultures. Twentieth-century

2. This study of tribal common law is primarily based upon legal resources, especially the
published and available decisions of tribal courts. Other studies, notably the work of KARL N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN P RLMaTIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941), rely upon informant accounts of the culturally based law. This anthropological
method is still used. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Is There Indian Common

Law? The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Olin Working Paper Number 92-3,
University of California at Berkeley, 1992). As an advocate for inclusion of American Indian law
and the tribal courts in the jurisprudence of the United States, the author has selected resources
available to those embarking on self-education on this important subject.
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American Indians are not copies of Anglo-Americans; as indigenous people
they are engaged in jointly preserving and changing a cultural way of
life. Likewise, the product of tribal courts is not a jurisprudential laminate.
Tribal courts can be the possible laboratories for new, beneficial concepts
in law.
I.

THE PERSISTING THIRD SOVEREIGN

The Indigenous Third Sovereign
American Indian tribes' status as nations on the North American
continent preceded the European invasion and persisted through the
resolution of conflicts among the European powers. The successor republic
of the United States (U.S.) then continued certain relationships with the
tribal nations. How the Europeans and the Euro-Americans treated the
indigenous nation states reflect both the practicalities and the jurisprudential theories operating during the encounters.
Since the European invasions of the Americas, the American Indian
tribes have been treated, in some form, as sovereigns or nation states
within the law of nations or international law. The tribes were recognized
as nations in international law before the formation of the republic. 3
The recognition continued in the emerging U.S., in the Constitution 4 and
in Supreme Court decisions that continuously uphold this political status.'

A.

3. See generally CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 1,at 47-58. Covering the pre-Revolutionary
period (1532-1789), the handbook summarizes the basic tenets under the law of nations and argues
that American Indian nations are sovereign powers whose governments and ownership of land should
be honored. In this period, Francisco de Victoria and others established the recognition of this
nation-state status which was not subordinated or obliterated by European powers' claims based
on divine rights or discovery. The basic tenets survive in contemporary American Indian law. See
also Robert A. Williams Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American
Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983).
4. Constitutional recognition of the tribal nations occurs with the exclusive federal authority
empowering Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The treaty power applies. Id. art. II,
§ 2, cl.2. Another provision excludes "Indians not taxed" from those to be counted as part of
the United States population for purposes of determining representative districts or apportioning
direct taxes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.3; cf. amend. XIV (restating exclusion of "Indians not
taxed" while eliminating the limitation on counting slaves). Other provisions in the Constitution
which provide for exclusive federal power include the war power and the power over federal property.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11; U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl.2. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 1,at 58-74 (covering the nation-to-nation relations and treaties between the Indian tribes
and the emerging United States republic in the Revolutionary War period and the early constitutional
period).
5. From early Marshall Court decisions through its most recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has maintained the status of American Indian tribes as sovereigns within the United States. They
are "distinct, independent political communities" whose status as sovereign governments was not
lost because of a protectorate relationship with the United States. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 557-59 (1832). As nations, the tribes are qualified to exercise powers of self-government
because of their original tribal sovereignty, not because of a delegation of power from the federal
government. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Sac, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
of Okla., 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991); U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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The legal history includes federal government policies which cyclically
aimed to exterminate the Indian tribes as nations, as identifiable populations, and as cultures. 6 Conversely, the federal government recognized
and protected in varying degrees the indigenous nationhood and promoted
tribal sovereignty and the power of self-governance. Today, the power
of the American Indian nations as the third sovereign remains indeterminate as to its meaning and boundaries. Undeniably, it is a power
unlike the federal and state governments. 7
Unanswered questions abound on how the federal government and the
fifty states identify, acknowledge, and respect the boundaries of power
of the American Indian nations. These nations persist in asserting a
sovereignty whose basis lies outside the foundation of a social contract.
The tribal nation's sovereignty is outside the "mutuality of concession"
that formed a national union with retained powers for the state units.'

6. See generally FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ESSAYS

(1981);

THE AGGRESSIONS

OF CIVILIZATION:

FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE

1880s (Sandra L.

Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984); ROBERT H. KELLER, AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND
THE UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1869-82 (1983).

7. Approximately 537 tribal government entities are the indigenous nations of concern in this
paper. Entities recognized and eligible for benefits and services from the United States, primarily
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, include 311 tribal entities in the lower 48 states and 226 Alaskan
governmental entities. See Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993). The Alaskan entities includes villages
as well as corporations formed through the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
Consequently, status as a sovereign nation, with the power of self-governance over communally
owned territory, does not exist for all the Alaskan entities recognized by the federal government
as eligible for government programs. Additionally, there are some 230 extant and functioning tribes
which have not been recognized by the federal government. Rachel Paschal, Note, The Imprimatur
of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgment Process, 66 WASH. L.
RaV. 209 (1991). The unrecognized tribes can apply for federal recognition through the "federal
acknowledgment process" established through a regulation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, not by
congressional act. Protections For Establishing That an American Indian Group Exists as a Tribe,
25 C.F.R § 85 (1993) (originally codified at 25 C.F.R. § 54). Since the acknowledgment process
began in 1978, 120 Indian groups have petitioned for federal recognition; final determinations have
been made on only 19 petitions. Pascal, supra, at 215-16. See also William W.'Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. § 83,
17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37 (1992); William W. Quinn, Jr., Public Ethnohistory? Or, Writing Tribal
Historiesat the Bureau of Indian Affairs, THE PuB. HISTORIAN 71 (1988). Because the acknowledgment
standards require complex documented information incompatible with oral societies and the duration
of the application review, American Indian tribes and organizations have asked Congress to act
and expedite the process. Some proposed bills revamp the general procedures while others focus
upon specific tribal groups seeking federal recognition. See H.R. 2549, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(bill to establish administrative procedures to extend Federal recognition to certain Indian groups
and statutory revision of 25 C.F.R. § 83); S. 1078 and f.R. 2366, 103d Cong., 1st Sess, (1993)
(bill to confirm the Federal relationship with the Jena Band of Choctaw Indians of Louisiana);
George Judson, Not 'The Last,' but an Official Tribe, Mohegan Indians Now Want Casino, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at A12 (Mohegan Tribe, popularly known as Mohicans, succeeded in obtaining
federal recognition through application filed in 1978); Timothy Egan, Indians Become Foes in Bid
for Tribal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at A8 (reporting that 21 petitions for acknowledgment
have been determined, with eight tribes obtaining federal recognition through 25 C.F.R. § 83
procedures).
8. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, Ill S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1991); see also Judith Resnik,
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 70102 (1989):
Indian tribe cases offer more than a chance to display appropriate sensitivity to
the experiences of many within this country. Indian cases provide vivid insight into
three central themes for federal courts' jurisprudence to explore: 1) whether and
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The "involuntary annexation" of tribal nations placed them outside of
the state and national polities, resulting in an extraconstitutional relationship that has not produced a coherent theory or guidance for relations
among the sovereigns. 9
Confusing questions and answers arise when the state and federal
governments and commentators seek resolution based on a viewpoint
which ignores the uniqueness of American Indian sovereignty. These
interjurisdictional encounters in the legal context produce American Indian
law and concepts which become part of this nation's jurisprudence. More
than a historical or legal misfit occurs in efforts to resolve issues arising
in relationships with the indigenous nations. A critically different cultural
perspective operates on the Indian side of the encounters.
The development of American Indian law has both denied and included
the cultural perspective of the third sovereign. Acknowledging the cultural
viewpoint of the indigenous nations is requisite for creating law appropriate for the Indians directly affected. Generally speaking, the indigenous
viewpoint is derived from origins as communal societies bound to coexistent relationships with nature. In tribal lawmaking this indigenous
perspective assumes centrality. Balance and harmony in one's relationships
with other community members, all life forms, and the physical universe
anchor the tribal values. These values set the goal of reconciliation in
the remediation of disputes. As Pommersheim compares the tribal and
non-Indian societies, "The traditional law and narrative of many tribes
... place emphasis on community, cooperation, and relatedness. However, the dominant legal narrative of majoritarian jurisprudence is often
rooted in individualism, competition, and autonomy." 10 In the tribal
society, past and present are inseparable as the continuation of a story
anchored in values enduring in contemporary life.
Accordingly, cultural viewpoint guides when American Indian nations
create enacted and common law. In the design and administration of
tribal government-the executive, legislative, and judicial branches-the
customs of the communal society are deliberately pervasive. In the creation
of American Indian common law, in the longstanding and emerging tribal
courts, custom serves in conjunction with appropriate principles from
federal and state law.

when the United States will tolerate subgroups that seek to be different and distinct
and to express such distinctions by self-governance; 2) whether such differences can
be sustained, given the interdependencies of the subgroup and the federal government;
and 3) whether distinct governance structures are to be desired and preserved or
forbidden and eroded.
9. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 417-20 [hereinafter Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and
Hard Work]; see also Robert J. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 842 (1990); Frank Pornmersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the
Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L. REV. 553 (1986) [hereinafter Pommersheim & Pechota].
10. Frank Ponmersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay On ConstitutionalAdjudication
in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 405 (1991).
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Using custom is essential for the cultural survival of American Indians
as a distinct people and as a governing entity. Cultural survival depends
on the economic development of tribal resources: land, water, minerals,
wildlife, and agricultural and natural resources. In its executive, legislative,
and judicial branches, the tribal government must implement policies and
laws that make productive the members' use of the nation's resources.
In selecting the ways to promote personal well-being for members and

economic gain for the community, most tribes seek means congruous
with tribal values and customs. Yet, the internal choices of tribes unavoidably intersect with external forces, the federal and state governments.
B.

Federal and State Relationships
The unique relationship between American Indians and the federal
government creates legal interactions extending much further than with
other ethnic populations in the United States. This greater degree arises
from the numerousness of issues and their complexity. The status of

American Indian nations as dependent sovereigns creates continuous disputes before the federal courts as tribal activities intersect with state or
federal concerns, for example, gaming, environmental regulation, and
custody of children. While tribal sovereignty endures, it remains hostage
to whatever limits Congress imposes through plenary power.
Consequently, Congress's use of plenary power to define the nature
and scope of the Indian nations' sovereignty creates a continuing dialogue,
tension, and often, new legislation to address emerging issues." Significant

federal legislation covers diverse areas, including jurisdiction over children,' 2 protection of Indian arts and crafts, 3 gaming enterprises, 14 jurisdiction over and control of environmental regulation, 5 and protection
of graves and cultural artifacts. 16 Indisputably, no other ethnically identifiable population has so complex a relationship with the national gov-

11. The vast federal authority and "plenary power" over Indian nations lacks universal acceptance.
See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365
(1989); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 46-59;
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 197-98, 207-28, 236 (1984); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live within Eurocentric
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress
Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 439 (1988); INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, UNITED
STATES DENIAL OF INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS: A STUDY IN LAWLESS POWER AND
NATION, reprinted in NATIONAL LAWYERS' GUILD, RETHINKING INDIAN LAW, at

RACIAL DISCRIMI-

15 (1982); Robert
N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy
and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 996-1001 (1981); RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y.
HENDERSON,

THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND

POLITICAL LIBERTY 257-69 (1980).

12. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
13. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
14. Federal Indian Gaming Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
15. Federal environmental laws allow the EPA administrator "to treat Indian tribes as states."
E.g. The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-1 l(a)(l) (1988); The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
16. Federal Graves and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 (West Supp. 1991).
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ernment and its legislature. 7 These relationships range from the most
personal matters of family relations, to occupational regulation of the
producers of crafts and arts, to the broadest jurisdictional issues among
local, state, and federal governments. Only American Indians present
such a national legislative range. During the political interactions involved
in Congressional lawmaking, tribal advocates are essential if tribal views
are to be included in legislative results.

Supreme Court decisions have also complicated the previously limited
relationship of tribes with state governments through decisions that recognize certain state interests. 8 Since the 1960s, the indigenous nations
have increasingly exercised their sovereignty. The growth and scope of
that power is most evident in the expanded formation and operations
of tribal governments. 9 Where jurisdictional questions arise, in the juncture with state and federal governments, new and nongeneric legal issues
serve as litigative fuel. The tribal courts, also increasing, are important
as the branch where the native sovereign uses custom to create jurisprudential principles distinct from the state and federal government. The
use of customary principles by tribal courts provides an alternative de-

cisional basis for state and federal courts and develops tribal common
law.

17. Monroe E. Price, Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profession,
1969 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 163:
Because the very existence of Indian organizations [and governments] is now dependent on the pleasure of Congress, law has taken on a role in the life of Indians
that it has thankfully not assumed over the life of almost any other groups. The
[federal] government's power is of life and death dimensions.
See also FELIX S. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 457 (1942) (describing the "basic materials of
Federal Indian Law" as: 4,264 statutes; 389 treaties; 1,725 reported cases; 523 opinions of the
Attorney General, etc.; 838 Interior Department rulings; 629 legal texts and articles; 141 tribal
constitutions; 112 tribal charters; and 301 Congressional reports and miscellany. The 50 intervening
years have only increased the federal legal complexities through which American Indians must
traverse).
18. E.g., Oklahoma State Tax Comm'r v..Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (tribal sovereign immunity precludes state from collecting sales tax on sales to tribal
members occurring on trust lands of a federally recognized tribe, though taxes can be imposed on
sales to nonmembers); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989) (pursuant to federal law, the tribe has a protectable interest that permits the
tribal government to impose zoning regulations on fee land within the closed area of reservation
while this authority does not extend to "open" areas); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1989) (state interest and related services suffice to impose severance tax on oil and
gas produced on reservation lands); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987) (state cannot regulate tribal bingo enterprises because of the compelling federal and tribal
interests in Indian sovereignty and self-government, including tribal self-sufficiency and self government); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (state's established interest in licensing liquor sales
dominates when the tribe has not traditionally regulated).
19. See supra note 7. States also recognize tribes for government-to-government purposes. The
purpose and determination of federal and state recognition are independent of each other. Approximately 36 state governments have established state agencies and commissions to promote and
manage relations with Indian governments. GOVERNORS'

INTERSTATE INDIAN COUNCIL DIRECTORY

(1993); see also Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future? 36 S.D. L. REV.
239 (1991) (discussing tribal-state relations and agreements on taxation, human services, and water.)
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Tribal Courts0
Tribally operated courts are "the primary tribal institutions charged
with carrying the flame of sovereignty and self-government. ' 21 They
implement executive policy decisions and legislative acts. The tribally
operated courts are the vanguard for advancing and protecting the right
of tribal self-government:

A.

A central focus of the Indian nations today .. .is the stabilization

of tribal governments as legitimate political entities within the American federal system of government, with paramount control over their
own territories, treaty rights, and resources. Tribal legislators and
executives must understand that such a stabilization of their authority
is impossible without a strong, effective, independent and respected

20. The term "tribal courts" encompasses the courts created through the exercise of sovereign
authority by tribes and by the authority of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Department of
Interior, to establish courts of Indian offenses. "'Indian court' means any Indian tribal court or
court of Indian offense." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1988). This section of the paper focuses on the
choice of tribal governments to establish courts designed for their particular and customary needs.
A tribe's governmental objectives cannot be met by existing majority courts. In modern tribal nations
some tribal objectives can be achieved through tribally-authorized courts or those established through
the BIA courts of Indian offenses. The BIA courts are transitional courts which serve until the
tribe establishes a court whose authority arises from the inherent sovereignty of the tribal nation.
The BIA courts are often called CFR courts after the Code of Federal Regulations under which
they operate [hereinafter CIO/CFR courts]. Both forms of courts allow the use of tribally-designed
law, though the CIO/CFR courts have civil jurisdictional limits not applicable to tribally-authorized
courts. Significant revision of the rules for CIO/CFR courts was published in 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406
(1993). Provisions mandate the use of customs of tribe, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified
at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(f) and establish that, if not prohibited by federal law, tribal ordinances,
custom, and usage shall be the applicable law, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,506 (1993) (to be codified at 25
C.F.R. § 11.500); cf. BIA regulation: Law and Order on Indian Reservations:
The governing body of each tribe occupying the Indian country over which a Court
of Indian Offenses has jurisdiction may enact ordinances which, when approved
by the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs or his or her designee, shall be enforceable
in the Court of Indian Offenses having jurisdiction over the Indian country occupied
by that tribe, and shall supersede any conflicting regulation in this part.
58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(e)). A tribe may develop its code
prior to establishing a tribally-authorized court; this allows code use in an interim CIO/CFR court.
Where distinctions should be made between those courts established through the power and authority
of the tribal governments as opposed to the BIA, this will be stated.
21. Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the
Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 71 (1988);
see also Frederic Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court
System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1012 (1991) ("The tribal courts also function to define the social
group by at least partially insulating tribal government from the jurisdiction of the federal and
state courts. Thus, a significant strengthening of the tribal court system ought to result in increased
tribal integrity."); John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of
Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495, 501 (1991) (tribal economic success is tied to the use of political
power, first in operating fair forms of government and "perhaps indistinguishable from the first,
an independent judiciary designed and empowered to render impartial judgments"); UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON

CIVIL

RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

29-70 (1991) [hereinafter Indian

Civil Rights Commission Report]. This report emphasizes the development of independent, adequately
funded tribal courts as essential to the legitimacy needed for tribal governments to engage in beneficial
political and economical relations with nonmembers and other governmental entities.
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Indian court system. Without an Indian judiciary, the tribes will always

be dependent on foreign, sometimes hostile, state or federal judges
22
to decide crucial questions that arise within the tribal territory.
Simultaneously, tribal courts must provide reliable and equitable adjudication in ordinary matters such as divorce and business issues critical
to the survival of the tribe. Lawyers sensitive to tribal cultural interests
are the professional vanguard to protect and advance tribal governments

in matters external and internal.
As courts designed and operated by tribal governments have multiplied,
when they assert jurisdiction these courts directly contact with non-Indians
and nonmember Indians. 23 Inevitably, these individuals challenge the tribe's

power over them. While the executive and legislative acts may encompass
such parties, the court is where the political entity's power is ultimately
exercised and used for legal determinations. Thus, concerns about the
reach of the tribal government's power become questions about the scope

of its court's authority or jurisdiction.
The scope of a tribally operated court's responsibilities has provoked

continuing attention from other courts, the media, and the public. The
non-Indian world reacts, sometimes with alarm, when tribal governments
assert rights that legally and economically affect nonmembers and the

22. Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231, 274
(1987). The variance in tribal cultures, situations and resources affects the particular governance
system and judiciary established by these nations. At the comprehensive end of the range are the
Navajo Nation courts, with several divisions and a fully-staffed Supreme Court, which serves a
population of over 143,000 living on over 25,000 square miles in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.
NAVAJO NATION, We the First Americans, in 7 BUREAU OF CENSUS (1993) (summary report on
American Indians and Alaskan Natives). The Navajo Nation courts processed over 45,000 cases per
year by 1987. Taylor, supra, at 236. Recently, Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Supreme
Court reported that in 1992 the Navajo Nation's courts handled 85,000 cases which included 16,000
criminal, 24,000 traffic, and 13,000 family law cases. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, Address at the
University of New Mexico School of Law (March 2, 1993). Other tribes, with smaller populations
and different circumstances are part-time operations with limited dockets.
23. In 1978, the National American Indian Court Judges Association, using data supplied by
the BIA, reported there were 71 tribal courts, 32 CIO/CFR courts, and 16 traditional courts. NAT'L
AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE (1978). In 1988, this number
rose to 150 courts, of which CIO/CFR courts were less than 20. Tribal Court Systems and the
Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988) (statement of Donald D. Dupuis, President, National American Indian
Court Judges Association); see also BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBAL COURT
PROFILES (1985). The CIO/CFR courts and their jurisdiction are listed in 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993)
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100) which names 20 courts, some of which serve more than one
tribe. Recently new CIO/CFR courts were authorized and opened in Eastern Oklahoma. The most
recent listing of the courts can be found at BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, TRIBAL GOV'T SERVS.,
DIRECTORY OF TRIBAL JUDICIARIES AND COURTS OF INDIAN OFFENSES (1993). The directory includes
tribally-authorized and CIO/CFR courts and lists the judges, personnel and appeals structure for
217 courts. The listing includes tribal judiciaries that do not receive funding from the BIA. See
also Maria Odum, Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991,
at B9 (reporting that "147 Indian tribal courts ... exercise jurisdiction over nearly two million
Indians in the United States"); Charles Aweeka, Tribal Courts: Unique System-Circuit Judges
Dispense Justice that is Based on a Different Set of Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 17, 1991, at Fi
(reporting that "There are 130 tribal courts and 250 Native-American court judges for the 260 tribes
with federal reservations in the U.S.").
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dominant society.24 Nonmembers make voluntary contracts with tribal
parties or act within the geographical reach of tribal regulatory schemes.
In disputes arising from contacts and the reach of tribal government
power, the non-Indian parties scrutinize the tribal court's claims of
integrity, fairness, and legitimacy.
Usually judicial authority is asserted by two types of tribally initiated
courts: the courts of Indian offenses and specific tribal courts. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA), through the authority of the Department of the

Interior, organizes the court of Indian offenses. 25 Tribal governments,

pursuant to their inherent sovereignty, establish and control specific tribal
courts. The tribally authorized courts have civil and limited
criminal
26
jurisdiction over lands designated as "Indian Country.
The two types of courts differ significantly. Which sovereign, the federal
or tribal, exercises the power to design and authorize the court is important. A crazy-quilt of jurisdiction exists in contemporary Indian law.
Whether the court operates under federal or tribal authority determines

its power over certain actors and acts. 7 However, important commonalities
24. Lis Wiehl, Indian Courts Struggling to Keep Their Identity, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 4, 1988, at
25.
25. CIO/CFR courts are organized under federal law for Indian nations under Title 25 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. The statutory authority for BIA law enforcement jurisdiction is in
the general authority of the Secretary of the Interior to conduct Indian affairs. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9
(1988). The new rules for CIO/CFR courts state:
It is the purpose of the regulation in this part to provide adequate machinery for
the administration of justice for Indian tribes in those areas of Indian country
where tribes retain jurisdiction over Indians that is exclusive of state jurisdiction
but where tribal courts have not been established to exercise that jurisdiction.
58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(b)). Compare with the former
purpose in 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(b) (1991): "It is the purpose of the regulations in this part to provide
adequate machinery of law enforcement for those Indian tribes in which the traditional agencies
for the enforcement of tribal law and custom have broken down for which no adequate substitute
has been provided under Federal or state law." The courts are federally funded and administered,
but the tribal nation initiates, collaborates, and consents in the contemporary pattern for establishing
these courts. Because of limited resources, small numbers of members, and geographical situations,
some tribal nations have chosen to establish CIO/CFR courts and intertribal courts instead of
separate tribally authorized courts. E.g., the Northwest lntertribal Court System serving 15 tribes,
the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals of South Dakota, and the Southwest Intertribal
Court of Appeals.
26. Indian Country as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
27. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (no tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians who commit minor criminal acts on tribal land). After the Duro decision Congress terminated
the effect of the Duro decision, returning to the tribes the jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
for minor criminal acts committed while on tribal lands. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. 102-137,
105 Stat. 646 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988)). See also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978) (absent Congressional delegation, Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction
to try and punish non-Indians). Generally, tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and
nonmember Indians for acts and relationships arising within the tribal territory ("Indian Country").
Civil jurisdiction can be exercised when non-Indians reside on or engage in acts on fee patented
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include the concern for the legitimacy and integrity of the decision-making
process and the sources of the law used (tribal, federal, and state).
The courts of Indian offenses were established in 1883 as a reform
2
responsive to a perceived need to regulate law and order on reservations.
They are often called CFR courts (CIO/CFR courts) after the extensive
Code of Federal Regulations which apply. In contrast, some traditional
tribal courts operated before and after contact with Europeans and the
formation of the U.S. republic. Cohen reported, "[m]ost traditional
systems were weakened or overwhelmed" by the changed conditions and
29
the power of the federal government. In response to such a perceived
void the Secretary of Interior relied upon his general authority over Indian
courts.
affairs, not an express statutory authorization, to establish these
30
Though some tribal nations maintained their own courts, at a peak
period in 1900 the CIO/CFR courts operated in about two-thirds of the
3
reservation districts served by BIA agents. ' The courts did more than
enforce law in a manner parallel to that used to prosecute offenses in
the dominant society. "Indian" conduct that resisted acculturation and
assimilation was punished. 32 The subsequent development of the CIO/
CFR courts was part of the New Deal era reform.
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 193433 reestablished the federal
policy of tribal self-determination and rejected the allotment policy aimed
at terminating tribal government. Under the IRA, tribes could organize

lands within the boundaries of the reservation which have an impact on tribal health, safety, or
economic security. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989); United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). Civil jurisdiction over nonIndians can also be asserted where non-Indians enter into consensual relationships with Indians or
the tribe, Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980), and when Congress
delegates to the tribes power to regulate non-Indian behavior, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975).
28. See Pommersheim, supra note 21, at 50-53 (historical description); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET
AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:' CASES AND MATERIALS 36-37 (3d ed. 1991) regarding CIO/CFR Courts
as response to Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (federal court denied authority to try and
punish an Indian for the murder of another Indian because tribes retained their "self-government
...the maintenance of order and peace among their own members" absent explicit renunciation
of the power by the tribe or removal of the power by Congress).
29. FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 332 (1982).
30. WILLIAM THOMAS HAGEN, INDIAN POLICE AND .UDGES 109 (1966). The Five Civilized Tribes,
the Indians of New York, the Osage, the Pueblos, and the Eastern Cherokees had recognized tribal
governments and maintained their courts. See also Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of
the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 17 (1974); RENNARD STRICKLAND, OF FIRE AND
SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT Xi, xii (1975):
There is a widely held belief that the Cherokees dramatically broke with their
ancient law ways and passed from a state of complete 'savage' lawlessness to a
highly sophisticated, efficiently operating 'civilized' system of tribal laws and courts
...the Cherokees did not, as is commonly believed, break all threads of continuity
with Cherokee tradition.
31. HAGEN, supra note 30, at 109.
32. Id. at 120. The 1892 CFR revision provided "[tihat if an Indian refuses or neglects to adopt
habits of industry, or to engage in civilized pursuits or employment, but habitually spends his time
in idleness and loafing, he shall be deemed a vagrant" and punished accordingly. Other offenses
included engaging in "heathenish" dancing, plural marriages, and the interference of medicine men
with the programs to civilize Indians. Id. at 110.
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1983).
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their governments, that is, draft their own constitutions, enact their own
laws through tribal councils, and institute their own court systems. The
BIA drafted most of the tribal constitutions in a generic fashion.

4

The

BIA constitutions did not provide for a separation of powers nor a

judicial system. The inclusion in IRA tribal constitutions
and independent courts was a subsequent modification.
The IRA did not address the CIO/CFR courts. In fact,
never expressly authorized these courts; their legitimacy
congressional acquiescence with the Secretary's use of his

of traditional
Congress has
derives from
power.' The

Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1935 published a revised Code of

Indian Tribal Offenses for these courts. The revised CIO/CFR code and
the IRA provisions restored a significant measure of self-determination
to tribal governments. Recently, new CIO/CFR courts have been established with the expanded growth in tribal governments. They serve as

interim courts until tribes authorize and operate their own courts.
Both tribally authorized and CIO/CFR courts are important in the

exercise of sovereign power and in building respect for the use of this

power.16 Each forum can use tribal law. Each forum must answer the

questions raised about legitimacy which naturally arise from nonmember
Indians and non-Indians brought within the court's jurisdiction. How
each tribe designs and operates its tribal courts demonstrates the need

for "legal-warriors,

3' 7

American Indians with law training who have

34. FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 149 (1982) ("Tribal
constitutions and corporate charters were subject to detailed examination before Secretarial approval
was granted. Although some constitutions were individualized, many were standard 'boilerplate'
constitutions prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and based on federal constitutional and
common law notions rather than on tribal customs."). See also NATIONAL AmERicAN INDIAN COURT
JUDGEs AssocIATION, supra note 23, at 7-13; Curtis Berkey, Implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 2, 4 (1976). Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing:
An Essay of Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. at 396 n.14 (1991/
92), points out that the omission of a Bill of Rights and a separation of powers from the IRA
constitutions "are the ones [omissions] that tribes are most criticized for, when in fact the blame
lies elsewhere."
35. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 333 (1982); see U.S. v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or.
1888) (The President, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, has the general power under the
federal statutes to establish courts of Indian offenses and provide for their jurisdiction.). CIO/CFR
courts, while serving a transitional function for tribes, remain under the control of the Department
of the Interior. United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 383-84 (8th
Cir. 1987).
36. "The Department of the Interior will accord the same weight to decisions of a Court of
Indian Offenses that it accords to decisions of a tribal court." 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.104(d)) (eliminates appeal to Department of Interior of CIO/CFR court
decisions). Iowa Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1986) ("Adjudication of such matters [onreservation tort] by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal lawmaking authority, because
tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law."). The Supreme Court rejected a
diversity argument and required the non-Indian insurer to exhaust tribal remedies as required under
National Farmers. The suit "should be conducted in the first instance in the tribal court itself.
Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the
challenge." National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1984).
37. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Law School Training of American Indians as Legal-Warriors
(1994) (unpublished article on file with the New Mexico Law Review). This article describes the
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retained their cultural identity and values. The architectural role and
implementive work of legal-warriors informed in tribal culture are important in building the legitimacy of the developing court systems.
The Legitimacy of Tribal Court
Legitimacy in law formally requires that judges decide cases in accordance with respected principles and not by personal or arbitrary values.
The decision reached must logically follow or use reasoning from the
legal rules that have been authorized. The court repeatedly uses and
3
refines the authorized rules based upon underlying principles. " As Dworkin analyzes law's development, the underlying principles are the important
guide to establishing and maintaining the integrity of the legal system.
Integrity generally refers to a personal or institutional adherence to a
code of moral or artistic values which is incorruptible. In a legal system,
integrity is inextricably related to due process, fairness, and the just result
an observer or affected party attributes to the court's decisions. The
affected persons expect to be protected from partiality, deceit, and other
abuses in the process and the decisions that control the lives of community
members.
Integrity in a judicial system starts with the political entity or community. Decisions which make integrity manifest are based upon the
values that a society has chosen for its moral and political foundation.
Principles of political morality must justify the state's use of coercion
and societal power over the lives of members and others. The court,
over time, should produce decisions that manifest a consistency with
guiding principles that evoke respect and obedience. As Dworkin points
out, abiding with principles, rather than every past decision, ultimately
promotes the acceptance of court decisions and the compliance from
community. 9
When parties and other affected persons refuse to abide by the court's
decisions, they have concluded that integrity is lacking. If the court's
mandates do not seem to require compliance, then the court does not
B.

specialized need for American Indians trained in law who also retain their cultural identity and
sensitivities. These legal-warriors are the tribal architects of government, especially the judicial branch
and tribal common law. Also discussed are the data on the number of American Indians entering
and graduating from law school, barriers to entry and successful completion of law school, and
conflicting cultural values that indigenously identified students confront in Anglo-American law
training. The article argues for the training of a new kind of lawyer, legal-warriors who can integrate
the best of two social and legal cultures into law appropriate for modern tribal nations. See Robert
Yazzie, Law School as a Journey, 46 ARK. L. REV. 271, 273 (1993):
You will pick up some souvenirs on your trip in the form of Anglo rules, principles,
and procedures. The trick is to put them into perspective. Win-and-lose adjudication
To
is alien to Indian values, which promote discussion and problem solving ....
the extent that knowledge of Anglo methods is necessary to defend tribes against
outside forces, you need to know it. Otherwise, you should always remember that
Indians have survived because (1) they chose the best from the outside culture, (2)
they have appropriately used what they learned, and (3) they have rejected that
which is not useful or which is destructive.
38. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPRE 176-276 (1986).
39. Id. at 183-84, 219-24; see also Pommersheim, supra note 21, at 59.
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have legitimacy. Parties and others may deny legitimacy because the court
forum, the actions of judges and personnel, the use of procedures, and
substantive law do not command respect. Establishing integrity and legitimacy as a properly authorized forum has been a major concern to
the tribal governments and courts, 4° commentators, 41 and to Congress.

40. The tribal governments struggle to establish and operate independent judiciary, staffed with
trained judges and personnel, who use tribal code and common law, which do not produce arbitrary
and capricious decisions. The scarcity of resources is a constant barrier, e.g., inadequate funding
for providing representation for indigent persons. Yet, fundamental principles are incorporated to
defend against the pressures of political factions and issues that could undermine legitimacy. See
the Indian Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 21, at 29-70. This section of the report
includes testimony and data on the varied forms that tribes have used to establish judicial forums
that warrant respect, from the Northwest Intertribal Court System serving 15 small tribes in
Washington State to the Navajo Nation Courts and their triumph in establishing judicial independence
while serving a nation without a constitution.
In the Navajo Nation, one case, Halona v. MacDonald (1977), has been called the "Marbury v.
Madison of Navajo jurisprudence." Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal
Government, 12 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 22 (1979). See Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 341
(Navajo D. Ct. 1978), aff'd, I Navajo Rptr. 189, 5 Indian L. Rep. 119 (1978) (Navajo law and
custom and federal law mandate judicial review of tribal council actions even though there is no
Navajo constitution to provide such judicial power). The Navajos faced a governmental crisis when
Chairman Peter MacDonald was prosecuted for 41 criminal offenses. He offensively challenged,
inter alia, the authority of the tribe's courts by terminating judge appointments, appointing and
seeking judges who would rule favorably to MacDonald, and challenging the authority of the tribal
council to remove him from office. The Navajo Nation appointed a special prosecutor pursuant to
legislation, and the non-Navajo prosecutor pursued cases through appeal. The Navajo courts'
independence endured. MacDonald's protracted attack upon the Navajo branches of government,
especially the courts, is documented. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep.
6079 (Navajo 1992); Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Sr., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6053 (Navajo 1991); In
re Bowman: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Sr., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6085 (Navajo 1989); In re
Certified Question I: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Sr., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6086 (Navajo 1989);
In re Certified Question I, Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6098 (Navajo 1989);
MacDonald v. Yazzie, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6099 (Navajo 1989); Plummer v. Brown, 16 Indian L.
Rep. 6100 (Navajo 1989); Plummer v. Brown, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6101 (Navajo 1989); MacDonald
v. Yazzie, 967 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion).
For other tribes, see Menominee Indian Tribe ex rel. The Menominee Indian Tribal Legislature
v. Menominee Indian Tribal Court, 20 Indian Law Rep. 6066 (Menominee Tribal Sup. Ct.) (1993)
(Menominee Constitution grants tribal judiciary the power to review legislation and enforce the
constitutional rights and duties of the legislature); Stone v. Swan, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6093, 6094
(Colville Tribal Ct. 1992) (courts of the Colville Confederated Tribes possess inherent jurisdiction
to review council and other tribal government actions); Chapoose v. Ute Indian Tribe of the UnitahOuray Reservation, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6023, 6026 (Ute Tribal Ct. 1986) ("[I]t is the province-and
duty of this tribal court to declare what the law is."); Sekaquaptewa v. Hopi Tribal Election Bd.,
13 Indian L. Rep. 6009, 6009-10 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986) (tribal court can interpret its own constitution
and review laws); Buffalo Horn v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6019, 6020-21
(Northern Cheyenne Tribal Ct. 1985) (tribal court orders the amendment of a tribal election ordinance);
Means v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Council, 11 Indian L. Rep. 6013, 6014 (Oglala Sioux Tribal Ct. 1984)
(court may review council ordinance which regulates the qualifications for council membership).
Compare Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. One 200-250 Foot Small
Mesh Gillnet, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6095, 6097-98 (Lac du Flambeau Tribal Ct. App. 1989) (under
provisions of the Lac du Flambeau Tribal Constitution the tribal courts do not have authority to
review legislative actions).
For discussion of the need for legitimacy for tribal courts, see Michael M. Pacheco, Finality in
Indian Tribunal Decisions: Respecting Our Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 119 (1991);
Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role
of the Tribal Bar as An Interpretative Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49 (1988); Frank
Pommersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and The Federal System: Emerging
Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L. REV. 553 (1986); Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of

Spring 1994]

TRIBAL COURTS AND COMMON LAW

For tribal governments, each session of Congress involves new struggles
fending off efforts to diminish
to obtain funding previously promised while
42
the jurisdictional power of tribal courts.

Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985); Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez:
Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1979).
41. Compare SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE
JUSTICE (1978) (criticizing the tribal courts for failing to meet the standards of state and federal
courts and, even if such standards were met, questioning whether another court system can be
justified) with NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE (1978)
(acknowledging the problems of creating independent courts while articulating standards for guiding
the existing and new tribal courts). See also Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness
in the Navajo National Code of Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15 (1992) (account of development
and adoption of new code of judicial conduct based on tribal custom and selective adoption of
ABA code); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 742-59 (1989) (discussing the value of Indian courts as the "other" courts
for the majority society); Richard B. Collins, American Indian Courts and Tribal Self-Government,
63 A.B.A. J. 808 (1977). Sharon O'Brien points out that:
American society historically has proven reluctant to accept and integrate the Indian
definition of social justice and culture into its mores .... Rawls, as have many
other philosophers, questions this basically utilitarian contention-that justice is
served if one group experiences a loss of freedom for the sake of the greater good.
This is, however, exactly the rationale used by American society to deny tribes
justice.
Sharon O'Brien, The Concept of Sovereignty: The Key to Indian Social Justice, in AMERICAN
INDIANS: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 44, 45 (Donald E. Green & Thomas V. Tonnesen eds.,
1991).
42. Congressional efforts include hearings by the oversight committees, especially the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, and proposed legislation to regulate tribal courts. Incorporating
the information from recent Senate hearings as well as its own hearings, the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission issued a report on how the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) had affected the tribal
courts. The Indian Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 21. In its investigation the Commission
produced data on how tribal courts are functioning in general. The Commission's conclusion is
substantively related to the criticism of tribal courts:
The ICRA was imposed on tribal governments by the Federal Government without
accompanying support in the form of adequate funding, resources, or guidance as
to how the rights guaranteed by the ICRA impact on tribal government. The
Commission believes that respect for tribal sovereignty requires that prior to any
further intrusion by the Federal Government into tribal justice systems, such as by
way of imposing Federal court review, tribal forums be first given the opportunity
to institute proper mechanisms that would operate with adequate resources, training,
funding, and support from the Federal Government.
Id. at 51.
Providing financial and technical assistance for tribal and CIO/CFR courts is the responsibility
of the Judicial Services Branch of the BIA. Lack of funding by Congress has produced the problems
outlined in the Commission's Report. See Maria Odum, Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at B9 (Chief Justice Tom Tso of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court: "If you cut the funding to other courts in the United States by 50 per cent-and I think
that would be equivalent to the situation we're in-would they be able to provide the full array
of civil rights?").
As one critical response to tribal courts, Senators Orrin Hatch and Slade Gorton have repeatedly
introduced legislation to allow federal review of tribal court decisions, including decisions that may
be based on custom. In response to one proposed act which would impose federal review, Hilda
Manual, former Chief Judge of the Tohono O'odham Tribal Court, said at the time she became
head of the Judicial Services Branch of the BIA, that the solution is improving tribal courts and
laws rather than eroding their power.
[T]he bureau (BIA) has the responsibility to help develop tribal courts, and they've
taken that responsibility by annually asking for money, and they've failed at doing
that. Now tribal courts are under attack because they don't have systems the
dominant society thinks they ought to have. If this legislation passes, it is an
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Some indicators of the growing legitimacy of tribal courts include (1)
the increase of legally trained Indian people within the many judicial
systems; (2) the revisions in tribal constitutions and development of codes;
(3) the continued recognition of tribal courts by the U.S. Supreme Court
as well as state courts; and (4) the development of customary law. 43 Of
these, the development of tribal-specific law presents the strongest case
for a judicial system tailored to serve the evolving indigenous sovereigns,
although the other elements matter. In the creation of tribal common
law the training and skills of the legal-warriors who operate and practice
in tribal courts will be tested.
Increasingly, Indians who serve as the judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and support personnel of the tribal courts are receiving quality
training. Specialized Indian related training is combined with programs
commonly available to state and federal judges and court officers. The
National American Indian Court Judges Association has provided training
for judges and staff for approximately twenty years. Some tribal judges
attend both the National Indian Justice Center at Petaluma, California
and the Judicial College at Reno, Nevada, which is also used to train
state judges." Increasing numbers of tribal court judges and officers are
attorneys .41

insulting, undermining attack without justification.
Anne Hazard, STATE'S NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 1990 (quoting Hilda Manual).
In 1991-92, three bills on tribal courts were introduced that addressed schemes to mandate federal
appellate review and alternatives to present funding and authorization. See Indian Tribal Courts
Act of 1991, S. 1752, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Indian Tribal Justice Act, H. 4004, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); Tribal Judicial Enhancement Act, S. 667, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). All three
bills failed to pass in the 1992 congressional session. In December of 1993 President Clinton signed
the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601),
which creates the Office of Tribal Justice in the BIA and authorizes monies and programs to assist
tribal courts. On proposed federal legislation and its purposes, compare Conrad W. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1418-24 (1985); Michael M.
Pacheco, Finality in Indian Tribunal Decisions: Respecting Our Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 119, 154-64 (1991); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indians, Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 738-42 (1989); Rennard Strickland, The Puppet Princess:
The Case for a Policy-OrientedFramework for Understandingand Shaping American Indian Law,
62 OR. L. REV. 11, 20 (1983) (advocating a systematic and analytical approach to the study of
Indian policy). See also Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992) (analyzing the legislative struggle to restore tribal court jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians who commit minor crimes on tribal territory).
43. Pommersheim, supra note 21, at 61.
44. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 22829 (1989) (describing selection of Navajo judges with continuing evaluation and training); Michael
D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, 67 MIcH. B. J. 366, 369 (1988) (describing the structure, authorizing
legislation and training of tribal court of the Grand Traverse Band in Michigan); Michael Taylor,
Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231, 236 n.22 (1987) (also lists
as judicial training resources the American Indian Lawyer Training Program of Oakland, California;
the American Indian Law Center located at the University of New Mexico; the Federal Legal Services
Corporation; and the BIA). The American Indian Bar Association, in conjunction with law schools
and bar associations, provides training for lawyers and judges.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1311(3) (1988) (Indian Civil Rights Act requires legal training for judges and
court personnel).
45. OKLAHOMA INDIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

1993 DIRECTORY OF INDIAN NATIONS AND TRIBAL COURTS

(1992). Oklahoma has 34 "tribal" courts, comprised of tribally authorized courts and CIO/CFR
courts; some tribes use both types of courts. "The majority of tribal judges in Oklahoma are
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The collaborative and valuable work of nonlawyers is congruous with
the increased expertise of judges and judicial personnel. Training and
certification programs are regularly available for persons who have functioned in traditional dispute resolution through their status and skill as
elders, peacemakers, advocates, and community representatives. Codification and common law based on custom and usage have further legit6
imized the work of these individuals in tribal courts.'
Drafting and revising tribal constitutions and codes is critical work in
governmental development; legal-warriors are essential in this work. Revision of generic IRA constitutions to establish an independent judiciary
needs.4 1
is the first step in making tribal governments responsive to modern
The codification of civil, regulatory, and criminal authority has increased
as indigenous nations strive to allay fears that tribal justice is unstructured
and that courts act arbitrarily and capriciously in both procedures and
substantive outcomes .

licensed attorneys and serve as judges on a part time basis." Id. at 2. See also Indian Civil Rights
Commission Report, supra note 21, at 50 n.92:
The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe also advised the Commission that since 1986 it
has made a concerted effort to upgrade its judiciary and legal staff. As of 1990,
its chief judge was an attorney who was a former assistant attorney general for
the State of Arkansas; two of its three appellate court judges had law degrees (one
of whom was Frank Pommersheim, who has taught and published on Indian law
matters); the tribal prosecutor was a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center;
the tribe's attorney general and assistant attorney general were both graduates of
Harvard Law School and the tribe's summer law clerks in the legal department
were both Harvard Law students.
It is noteworthy that neither the Federal Constitution nor some state constitutions expressly require
that judges be trained and licensed attorneys. The practice of appointing only attorneys is an
evolutionary result. Nonattorneys have served as judges in state judicial systems, especially those
with justices of the peace.
46. See Tso, supra note 44. Recently, The Native American Bar Association and the Indian
Law Support Center operated by the Native American Rights Fund initiated a historical set of
conferences, the National Conference on Traditional Peacemaking and Modern Tribal Justice Systems
(October 29-30, 1992, Albuquerque, N.M.), and the National Conference on Traditional Peacemaking
Remaking Justice (September 20-22, 1993, Arizona State University). The papers from these conferences comprise a unique and creative resource for attorneys, tribal judges, tribal government
officials, and those who study tribal courts. See also NATIONAL INDIAN JUSTICE CENTER, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE

RESOLUTION MANUAL

(1989).

47. Creating an independent judiciary is a critical task for tribal governments. While the task
is achievable in a separation of powers theory, other concepts of government structure suffice, see
note 40 regarding tribal courts' independent reviewing power. Modern tribal constitutions break
away from the boilerplate IRA models by creating independence for the judiciary and, more
importantly, creating independence from the control of the Secretary of Interior. The IRA boilerplate
constitutions provided that the Secretary would have to approve tribal ordinances. This power lacks
any statutory basis for requiring the Secretary approve or veto ordinances. See ROBERT N. CLINTON
ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 362-79 (3d ed. 1991); Summary Report of
Hearings and Investigationi by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1964). For a discussion of the foundational work required
in tribal constitutions, see Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional
Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393 (1991/92). Pommersheim describes the Rosebud
Sioux's constitutional revisions which removed the review authority of the Secretary of Interior as
a way to increase tribal sovereignty. See also Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, 67 MICH. B. J.
366 (1988) (stressing the importance of providing for judicial independence in the provisions of
revised constitutions, as was done with the Grand Traverse Band Constitution).
48. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court refused to make nonmember
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Drafting and recording the foundational law of the tribe demands
creative and integrative skill from legal architects. It is difficult work to
mediate between the customary needs of the tribe and the duties of a
modern government. Then, to some degree, the fears of outsiders must
be allayed by the formal and operative system. Because of the recency'
of many tribal courts, "much tribal court litigation involves cases in
which there is no controlling authority. This alone suggests the possibility
for innovative and creative lawyering, which, as a necessary by-product,
can help forge a meaningful and enduring tribal jurisprudence. ' 49 As
Pommersheim reminds, all attorneys involved in the tribal courts have
critical contributory roles. The tribal bar "must now rise to the challenges
of both culture and history and individual client representation. ' 50 When
the tribal bar produces code drafting, briefs, decisions, and common law
pronouncements with skill, specificity, and fairness, these professionals
increase the legitimacy attributed to the tribal courts.
The recognition given to tribal courts by the Supreme Court and state
courts affirms the legitimacy of tribal justice systems. In civil cases the
Supreme Court has held that non-Indians or nonmember Indians cannot
escape adjudication of tribal courts. 5 While the Court denied criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in Duro v. Reina, Congress subsequently passed a statute providing tribal jurisdiction over all Indians
who commit minor crimes on tribal territory.5 2

Indians subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction without the individual's consent and participation in
the political entity:
While modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial process,they
are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they
serve. Tribal courts are often "subordinate to the political branches of tribal
governments," and their legal methods may depend on "unspoken practices and
norms."
Id. at 2064 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253,
334-35 (1982)). Tribal courts are conscious of the fears of non-Indians and of nonmember Indians.
For example, the Intertribal Court of Appeals has stated:
We in this Indian court understand and must accept the racial fear that would be
felt by non-Indians if they were to appear in an Indian tribal court to account for
a criminal act. This is the same fear felt by many, many Indians who must face
white judges, prosecutors and juries in states often hostile to Indians' presence
within their boundaries.
Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian. L. Rep. 6008, 6009 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1984). In
his concurrence in Miller, Judge Gregory urged that tribal codes and decisions be written and
reported because "[t]he wasicu (whites) have, with compounded progression, used words or lack
of them against Indians ....

The written word is a tool which must be learned and used as it is

the modern day weapon." Id. at 6013. In a case where four jurisdictions had entered five orders,
the Sitka Community Association Tribal Court articulated five elements which demonstrate that the
tribal court was both competent and most appropriate for a fair resolution. Hepler v. Perkins, 13
Indian L. Rep. 6011, 6018-19 (Sitka Community Ass'n Tribal Ct. 1986).
49. Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work, supra note 9, at 454.
50. Id.

51. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (exhaustion of tribal court remedies is
required in diversity cases; diversity statute not intended to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts
nor impair tribal sovereignty in this way); National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (until petitioners have exhausted the remedies available in the tribal
court it would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
52. Duro created "zones of lawlessness" where no government (tribal, state, or federal) had
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Under theories of full faith and credit and comity some state courts
recognize and enforce tribal court decisions. The constitution and the
federalism scheme do not mandate this response to decisions from a

nonstate jurisdiction. So the state recognition is derived from statutory
policy53 as well as judicial discretionary authority.5 4 However, it is not

criminal jurisdiction over certain criminal acts. Justice Kennedy, for the majority, invited Congress
to redress this problem, "If the present jurisdictional scheme proves insufficient to meet the practical
needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address the problem is Congress,
which has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs." Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990).
A temporary suspension of Duro's effect on tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who commit
minor crimes within a tribe's jurisdictional territory was enacted in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856, 1867. Permanent reversal of Duro
was enacted by Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646, codified as 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1991).
53. Some state statutes provide for full faith and credit, but qualify this recognition process by
requiring reciprocity from the tribal courts. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (1992) (state supreme
court authorized to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to tribal court records and
proceedings where "tribal courts agree to grant reciprocity of judgments of the courts of the State
of Oklahoma in such tribal courts"). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West Supp. 1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (1991 & 1993 Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-1-25 (1992).
Because this type of statute imports and imposes state law as tribal law, tribal governments are
wary of such statutory approaches. Additionally, the insistence on using full faith and credit and
comity as the conceptual framework burdens the legislative and judicial dialogue about how to
recognize and enforce tribal court .decisions. Richard E. Ransom, et. al., Recognizing and Enforcing
State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 Am. INDtAN
L. REv. 239 (1993).
54. Some state court decisions offer full faith and credit, comity, and other bases for recognizing
and enforcing tribal court judgments. There is no consistent pattern nor consistency among states
nor within the same state's decisions. Compare Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982)
(tribal judgments entitled to full faith and credit); Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362,
533 P.2d 751 (1975) (tribal laws entitled to full faith and credit); In re Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555
P.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1976) (state court assumes without deciding Navajo custom granted full faith
and credit in state courts); In re Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976) (tribal court orders entitled
to full faith and credit); with Leon v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (Indian court
judgments would be recognized under principle of comity); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d
512 (Mont. 1982) (judgment of Indian courts entitled to comity, with same deference as foreign
judgments); In re Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (Mont. 1981) (exclusive tribal court jurisdiction recognized
as matter of comity); Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 18 Indian L. Rep. 5001 (N.D. 1990)
(enforcing the tribal court judgment and rejecting defendant's contention that Three Affiliated Tribes
judge guided by a jurisprudence the state should not-sanction); and with In re Lynch, 377 P.2d
199 (Ariz. 1962) (proceedings before an Indian court are to be treated as a proceeding of foreign
state); Begay v. Miller, 222 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1950) (enforcing tribal court judgment although full
faith and credit or comity inapplicable); People v. Superior Court, Kern County, 18 Indian L. Rep.
5012 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court must issue subpoena for California resident to appear in
Navajo court because Navajo Nation included within meaning of "state" in Uniform Act to Secure
Attendance of Witnesses from Without State in Criminal Proceedings); Wakefield v. Little Light,
347 A.2d 228 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (recognizing tribal court actions as binding); State ex rel. Steward
v. District Ct., 609 P.2d 290 (Mont. 1980) (tribal domestic relations code provides exclusive jurisdiction
to tribal courts; Montana courts defer under principle of comity); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370
N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985) (tribal court orders recognized under principle of comity where tribal court
adheres to specific standards); Barrick v. Johnson, 7 Indian L. Rep. 4001 (S.D. 1979) (where tribal
court has exclusive jurisdiction, state agencies must respect and act on tribal court order).
Accord Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.21 (1978) (judgments of tribal courts
entitled to full faith and credit); see also U.S. v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1992) (comity
considerations warrant federal court abstention); Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation, 783 F. 2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (comity requires deference to tribal court procedures).
But see Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (full faith and
credit and comity do not require recognition of tribal custom though tribal court relinquished
jurisdiction in this case); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 144 (N.D. 1980) (full faith and
credit clause inapplicable to Indian tribes).
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the majority pattern for states to recognize and enforce tribal judgments.

Congress has mandated full faith and credit for tribal court judgments
in specific subject areas. Under the terms of the Indian Child Welfare
Act, state courts must recognize and enforce tribal court judgments
regarding children in certain custodial proceedings." Additionally, under
the terms of the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, both

state and federal courts must extend full faith and credit to tribal court

56
judgments regarding forced trespass.

Absent a federal or state mandate to recognize and enforce a tribal
court order, the nontribal court still judges the law underlying the tribal
court opinion. The receiving court considers the underlying principles and
any rules used in the tribal decision. Authorizing law that is derived

from distinct tribal custom and usage is an unknown for many non-

Indian courts. For the tribal order to be fairly considered, non-Indian

courts and their officials must seek knowledge about tribal customary
law.
C.

Custom and Indian Law
The legal principles derived from American Indian custom distinguish
the tribal nations' judicial system from non-Indian American jurisprudence. The developmental process of converting custom into common

law should not seem alien to non-Indians; a similar process occurred in
Anglo-American common law. For tribal courts, the customary underlying
beliefs and conduct provide a contemporary foundation, not just an
inescapable past. The difference between the Anglo-American courts and
the indigenous nations' judicial systems must be more than the ethnic
identity of the people who operate the courts, the geographical location,
or the physical arrangement of the forum.5 7 External sources, other
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988):
Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of Indian
tribes.
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody
proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. IV 1993):
Indian tribes which adopt the regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section shall have concurrent civil jurisdiction to enforce
the provisions of this section and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies of the Federal Government shall, at
the request of the tribe, defer to the tribal prosecutions of forest trespass cases.
Tribal court judgments regarding forest trespass shall be entitled to full faith and
credit in Federal and State courts to the same extent as a Federal court judgment
obtained under this section.
57. These elements can distinguish between the two judicial systems. It is valuable that American
Indian people attribute legitimacy to forums operated by people with physical similarities, that the
court is geographically located in Indian Country regardless of its remoteness from the major
population centers of American power, or that the court allows informal or dual language forms
of testimony. These characteristics build the acceptability of the court as a regular part of the tribal
community and as an institution with a designated role in self-governance. The decisions from courts
with these characteristics still must be scrutinized to determine whether the legal principles used
render fairness and justice.
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governments and their citizens, require from tribal courts a justification
beyond cultural and idiosyncratic elements. There must be guiding principles which promote integrity. Likewise, tribal courts cannot be measured
or justified solely by the degree to which they imitate state and federal
courts.
The tribal courts creatively use indigenous customs and usages that
survived the five-hundred-year encounter and struggle with Euro-American
cultures. Despite the repeated efforts to destroy the cultural foundation
of American Indian tribes, important customary principles persisted. Custom and usage identify different parts of the cultural system. Custom
is the belief component. Usage identifies the conduct or behavior in
conformance to specific customary beliefs.
When custom and usage underlie the tribal codified and common law,
the created tribal jurisprudence is appropriate for the indigenous people
governed by it.
It is . .. integral to the idea of a custom that the past practice of
conformity is conceived as providing at least part of the reason why
the practice is thought to be proper and the right thing to do. Clearly
law is an institution that is in part customary in this
the common
58
sense.

Custom as a concept must be separated from other cultural elements
that imply nonformalized ideas and codes of conduct.5 9 To become
"enforceable at common law a custom had to be: (1) legal, (2) notorious,
(3) ancient or immemorial and continuous, (4) reasonable, (5) certain,
(6) universal and obligatory ... a creature of its history." 6 Custom is
distinctively a pattern of thought or way of perceiving and feeling about
the elements of life. When conduct is affected by this thought process,
then usage occurs through the practice or regularity of behavior.

58. Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW
19 (William Twining ed., 1986).
59. James W. Zion, Harmony Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MONT. L. REV.
265, 275 (1984) [hereinafter Zion, Harmony]. "Tradition," "custom," and "usage" are not synonymous, though they are often used interchangeably. "It is possible for a tradition not to be a
custom or usage, and many customs and usages are not traditional. Some traditions may be a
custom." Custom is more than opinion; it is a common belief which results in practice or regularity
of conduct. Id.; see also James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old
and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983) [hereinafter Zion, Navajo
Peacemaker] (describing the search for and ascertainment of custom resulting in the formal establishment of the Peacemaker Court as an alternative dispute resolution forum within the Navajo
Supreme Court); Frederic Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal
Court System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991 (1991).
60. Joseph H. Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1965). Levie provides a conceptual connection
between the customary basis of common law and its prominent progeny in the Uniform Commercial
Code; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 190, 212 (1881); 1 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 183-89 (2d ed. 1898); E.K.

Braybrooke, Custom as a Source of English Law, 50 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1951); Julius Goebel, Jr.,
King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416
(1931).
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For judges in the tribal courts, the thought and conduct must be
"known, accepted, and used by the people of the present day." 6 ' The
tribal litigators and judges must decide when custom and usage, which
do evolve and change in some degree, should be determinative in decisions. 62 This process is similar to the Anglo-American experience, which
may be serendipitous. This writer proposes only that the similarity should
facilitate the understanding and acceptance of tribal common law. The
legitimacy of the tribal common law, however, is not dependent upon
a shared process with Anglo-American common law.

In common law, "the starting-point is in customs, not the customs of
individuals but the customs of courts governing communities. Those
courts, in England essentially community meetings, had to make all kinds
of decisions." ' 63 As Milsom describes these community meetings, they
made decisions about the legal future concerning allocation of resources
and the settlement of disputes. 64 The common law, as described by
Blackstone, consisted of customs, used throughout a country, or of

61. Zion, Harmony, supra note 59, at 275. The tribal courts have addressed this ascertainment
process, e.g., in the Navajo courts:
There may be a dispute as to what the custom is and how it is applied; or, a
tradition of the Navajo may have so fallen out of use that it cannot any longer
be considered a "custom." The courts should see whether a particular custom or
tradition is generally accepted and applicable to the parties before the Court.
Hood v. Bordy, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6061, 6063 (Navajo 1991); In the Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Appeals:
If there are standards, traditional values, and cultural traditions which a party in
an action in a tribal court believes are of great importance and that are required
for proper interpretation of the tribal code, then it is the duty, obligation, and
responsibility of trial counsel to bring forth testimony to establish facts which would
show such traditional values and Indian standards.
C.B. v. Little Flower Freedom Center, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6121, 6123 (Northern Plains Intertribal
Ct. App. 1991).
62. In developing tribal courts some tribes have engaged in pre-establishment research to ascertain
what customs have been retained as "survivals" and are appropriate for a contemporary tribal
system of law. In undertaking such cultural continuity projects, tribes have used modern devices,
e.g., research grants from public and private sources, recorded interviews, etc. See NORTHWEST
INTERTRIBAL COURT SYSTEM AND THE SAUK-SUIATTLE,

SKOKOMISH AND SWINOMISH TRIBES, TRADITIONAL

AND INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IN THE TRIBES OF THE PUGET SOUND AND OLYMPIC

PENINSULA REGION (1991) [hereinafter NORTHWEST INTERTRIBAL], a report on how these tribes
ascertained the customary principles through interviewing elders, knowledgeable persons, and community members as the requisite to structuring the Northwest Intertribal Court System that serves
15 tribes.
63. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (2d ed. 1981).
64. Id. at 1-2. Compare Dworkin's discussion of the role of communities as moral actors and
decision makers and the difference between "bare" and "true" communities where the latter can
engage in decisions about moral and political principles that provide equality and duties among
members. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 195-216.
See also Levie, supra note 60, at 1107, on the use of custom which resulted in the U.C.C., e.g.,
U.C.C. § 1-205 (2): "A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question." The U.C.C. drafters chose not to require that a custom
must be ancient to be recognized and deliberately preferred the term "usage of. trade." According
to Ronald A. Anderson, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, TEXT, CASES, COMMENTARY § 1-205:18 (3d
ed. 1981), "[t]he term 'usage of trade' and 'custom' have the same meaning . . . . Customs develop
through necessity and mutual trust between responsible business persons."
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customs specific to a geographically identified people. 65 "The materials
of the common law, therefore, were the customs of true communities
whose geographical boundaries had in some cases divided peoples and
cultures, and not just areas of governmental authority."" As Milsom

describes the development of common law it arose from different governmental authorities or jurisdictions using varied customary foundations.
The descriptions of Anglo-American common law do not present a
generative community different in capacity from that found in tribal

common law. The variance is among the over 500 tribal nation-communities and differences with the non-Indian common law. Time and
generational distance from earlier Anglo-American customs, as well as
skepticism, may prompt those who question the similar use of custom

by American Indian courts. 67 Yet, indigenous jurisprudence, like its AngloAmerican
counterpart, is capable of producing cognizable fairness and
8

justice.

6

65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67. Zion, Harmony, supra note 59, at 269-73,
provides a persuasive treatment on the use of Anglo-American custom in U.S. courts which is not
dissimilar from what tribal courts are doing. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Customs and Usages § 1 (1981)
(customary law recognized and established in Anglo-American jurisprudence); see also Tso, supra
note 44, at 230:
When we speak of Navajo customary law, however, many people become uneasy
and think it must be something strange. Customary law will sound less strange if
I tell you it is also called 'common law.' Our common law is comprised of customs
and long-used ways of doing things. It also includes court decisions recognizing
and enforcing the customs or filling in the gaps in the written law.
See also In re Estate of Belone, 5 Navajo Rptr. 161, 165 (1987) (The Navajo Nation Supreme
Court announced its "preference for the term 'Navajo Common Law' rather than 'custom,' as that
term properly emphasizes the fact that Navajo custom and tradition is law, and more accurately
reflects the similarity in the treatment of custom between Navajo and English common law.").
66. Milsom, supra note 63, at 12; see also KATHERINE S. NEWAN, LAW AND EcONOMIc
ORGANIZATION: A CoMPARATrI E STUDY OF PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 51-103 (1983). Newman presents
a conceptual framework and empirical study on sixty preindustrial societies which are analyzed
according to a typology of legal systems. The eight types range from a self-redress kinship system
without external institutions or third-party roles to formalized, institutionalized systems where third
persons make decisions that are enforceable. Newman's eight categories depend upon community
concurrence on the principles underlying the law and the role of the decision maker.. Simpson, supra
note 58, at 22, stated that:
Settled doctrines, principles and rules of the common law are settled, because for
complex reasons, they happen to be matters upon which agreement exists, not, I
suspect, because they satisfy tests. The tests are attempts to explain the consensus,
not the reasons for it .... What is involved is basically an oral tradition, still
only imperfectly reduced to published writing.
67. The contemporaneous use of custom by the United States Supreme Court also arouses
controversy because of the absence of an explicit or implied constitutional source for the right at
issue, e.g., the fundamental right of privacy and whether this right in intimate relations can be
limited by states because of certain state interests, including customary beliefs about heterosexuality
and homosexuality. See Webster v. Casey, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, supra note 44. Chief Justice
Tso of the Navajo Supreme Court states:
Both our language and our traditions make Anglo court systems strange to us. In
traditional Navajo culture the concept of a disinterested, unbiased decisionmaker
was unknown. Concepts of fairness and social harmony are basic to us; however,
we achieve fairness and harmony in a manner different from the Anglo world. For
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Federal Indian law recognizes Indian customs as decisional principles.
Besides the tribes' inherent sovereignty, federal policy aims to promote
tribal self-determination; under both sources tribal nations authorize their
courts to use custom. The CIO/CFR courts are also permitted to apply
tribal crstoms in civil cases. 69 One process to establish the existence of
custom is addressed in the code for the CIO/CFR courts, "[w]here any
doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the tribe the court may
request the advice of counselors familiar with these customs and usages."v 0
Tribal courts use similar directives. 7' A significant legitimizing of custom
occurs in the federal and state court decisions that recognize and affirm
72
tribal custom in decisions.

the Navajo people, dispute settlement required the participation of the community
elders and all those either knew the parties or were familiar with the history of
the problem. Everyone was permitted to speak. Private discussions with an elder
who could resolve a problem was also acceptable. It was difficult for Navajos to
participate in a system where fairness required the judge to have no prior knowledge
of the case, and where who can speak and what they can say are closely regulated.
The advocates helped the Navajos through this process, and the advocates continue
to be an important link between the two cultures.
Id. at 229.
The advocates are nonlawyer members of the Navajo Nation Bar Association who have completed
training or certification and who can represent parties. See also statement by Oglala Sioux Supreme
Court:
It should not have to be for the Congress of the United States or the Federal
Court of Appeals to tell us when to give due process. Due process is a concept
that has always been with us. Although it is a legal phrase and has legal meaning,
due process means nothing more than being fair and honest in our dealings with
each other.
Bloomberg v. Dreamer, No. 90-348, slip. op. at 5-6 (Oglala Sioux Civ. App. 1990), cited in
Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051, 6054 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991);
see also Indian Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 21, at 11-12 nn.36-43, listing tribal
court opinions pertaining to the right to a trial by jury, to a fair and speedy trial, to adequate
jail conditions, to the right to counsel, to due process in the administration of justice, to equal
protection under the law, to reasonable search and seizure, and to freedom from fines.
69. "In all civil cases the Court of Indian Offenses shall apply any laws of the United States
that may be applicable, any authorized regulations of the Interior Department, and any ordinances
or customs of the tribe occupying the area of Indian country over which the court has jurisdiction
not prohibited by Federal laws." 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F R. § 11.500(a)).
70. 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 11.500(b)); see also 58 Fed. Reg.
54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 11.500(c)): "Any matters that are not covered by the
traditional customs and usages of the tribe, or by applicable Federal laws and regulations, shall be
decided by the Court of Indian Offenses according to the laws of the State in which the matter
in dispute lies."
71. Zion, Navajo Peacemaker, supra note 59, at 92-97 (The Navajos consulted with elders and
counselors to determine the custom which resulted in the formal establishment of the Peacemaker
Court within the judicial system with specific rules for its jurisdiction.). See also Hepler v. Perkins,
13 Indian L. Rep. 6011, 6013-16 (Sitka Community Ass'n Tribal Ct. 1986) (question of tribal custom
certified to Sitka Court of Elders); Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6008,
6011 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1984) (tribal code mandates tribal judges "shall take judicial notice of
tribal custom and usage" which may require the use of expert witnesses). See also NORTHWEST
INTERTRIBAL, supra note 62, regarding ascertainment of custom as prerequisite to establishing
individual tribal courts for fifteen tribes and an intertribal court of appeals. Appellate court opinions
from 1987 through 1990, using tribal custom, codified law, and common law decisions, are reported
in Appellate Court Opinions, Northwest Regional Appellate Courts.
72. E.g., Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989) (property interests
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Tribal courts and commentators point out that custom does not necessarily mean unwritten, irregular, or inconsistent rules of law. Customary
principles may be codified or established when the court takes judicial
notice of custom, uses it for the decision, and then publishes the opinion.
Increasingly, the need to codify, document, and publish is recognized
because the development of a law system provides the benefits of precedent, predictability, and notice to those subject to the law. 73 Codification
and publication are largely noncustomary parts of Indian law that require
74
tribes to appreciate this practice of Anglo-American law.
Achieving regularity through publication 7 and codification of custom
helps legitimate the tribal courts and allay the fears of nonmembers about
tribal courts. In Kafkaesque nightmare scenarios, Indian and non-Indian
members envision a capricious, unfair, and unjust system subject to
political abuse. 76 A brief review of how custom functions in tribal court
decisions demonstrates the uniqueness, the legitimacy, and fairness of
custom-based rules of law.

created by tribal law or tradition not a federal question); Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976) (firmly established tribal custom should not be impaired in applying
equal protection in election case); Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457 F. Supp. 384 (D. Alaska
1978) (difficult issues of Tlingit custom, tradition and law should be resolved by tribal court);
Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976) (Navajo custom recognized by state court).
73. Zion, Navajo Peacemaker, supra note 59, at 107; Brandfon, supra note 59, at 1014 n.143;
Taylor, supra note 22, at 238-41; Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6008, 601213 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1984) (Gregory, J., concurring) (urging that "true Indian law" should be
written and recorded for all time so that it may be used, followed, and remembered).
74. Some tribes established written and published laws. For example, previous Cherokee documentation was affirmatively accelerated with the invention of the Cherokee language syllabary by
Sequoyah, and the Cherokee Nation acquired a printing press and type cast in the syllabary in
1828. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIrrs: CHEROREE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 107 (1975)
(citing LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION §§ 47, 81, 82, 84 & 85 (1852); ALTHEA BASS, CHEROKEE
MESSENGER 78-89 (1936); RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, ELIAS BOUDINOT, CHEROKEE AND His AmEmCA
106-19 (1941)).
75. Publication is available to tribal courts through the Indian Law Reporter, published by the
American Indian Lawyer Training Program. The Reporter in 1983 subsumed the Tribal Court
Reporter which was also published by the same training program. The Navajo Nation appears to
have the only tribal reporter which contains all major opinions of the courts of the Navajo Nation
since 1969. The Navajo Reporter, Official Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Supreme
Court and the District Courts in the Navajo Nation, published by Navajo Community College Press,
Tsaile, Arizona. To date, regularity of publication is emerging, rather than established as a practice
among all tribal courts. The Westlaw and LEXIS systems have not incorporated tribal court decisions
into their data bases. Indian law cases are included when these cases are reported by the state and
federal courts. The two computerized data systems also do not have a topical database in Indian
law as they do for other areas, e.g., civil rights, intellectual property, insurance.
76. Indian law practitioners and scholars strongly argue for tribal responsibility in using the
enforcement and judicial power. Abuse in denying fair treatment and access to tribal courts for
nonmembers feeds the fears and campaigns to limit tribal sovereignty and tribal court authority,
as in the repeated congressional bills introduced to mandate federal review of tribal courts. See
Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L. Rv.
1, 26 (1979); CLINTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 393-97 (discussing the "exception" to tribal
jurisdiction made in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981)). In the "Dry Creek exception" non-Indian plaintiffs were
denied access to tribal courts and thereby would have been without a forum or remedy, if the
federal courts had nbt accepted jurisdiction. Id.
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Custom in Indian Law Decisions

1. Selected Tribal Court Decisions
A selective review of tribal court decisions illustrates how custom can
be explicitly recognized and used in substantive law. The use of custom
and the associated reasoning reveal the integrative task facing tribal courts.
Initially, the tribal courts must determine what is validated custom. The
question is whether the indigenous people acknowledge, accept, and conform their conduct in accordance with a stated concept. Additionally,
the court may look to state and federal law for culturally appropriate
models and guidance. Both of these law-seeking tasks call for the skills
and sensitivities found among able legal-warriors.
The limits of each type of law become evident when the human situation
does not fit within the existing notions of tribal, federal, or state law.
In some areas, such as environmental law, the tribal government is subject
to the provisions of federal statutes and regulations. Whether by choice
or federal requirement, the tribal courts look at federal and state law
for principles and rules of law. Whatever is used should make sense for
a culture with traditional values to be accommodated in a contemporary
tribal society.
The selected tribal court decisions also show how customary alternatives
to the adversarial forum can function in contemporary tribal judicial
systems. The adversarial win-lose paradigm is not appropriate in customary
alternatives. Indigenous custom and law can offer useful models for the
majority culture. The adoption of alternative dispute resolution methods
in Anglo-American law affirms the usefulness of methods long established
in the indigenous nations.
The results of using custom are not necessarily uniform across the
different tribal nations holding a commonly stated value. It is possible
to hold a deep regard for land, the elderly, or children as the critical
future resource of a society and reach similar and dissimilar decisions.
The legal reasoning based on custom can also result in outcomes facially
indistinguishable from those based on federal or state law. One must
distinguish external form from internal substance to appreciate how the
outwardly similar is not so. This approach is critical in jurisprudence
and other ways of studying human phenomena, including how indigenous
people perceive, organize, and explain their world. 77 One must avoid

77. The concern for external form and internal substance are part of jurisprudential discourse
as well as the cultural framework of indigenous peoples. Professor Dworkin states: "Both perspectives
on law, the external and the internal, are essential, and each must embrace or take account of the
other." DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 13. As Dworkin describes the internal, it is the participant's
point of view which focuses on the essential principles and foundation for legal claims. He focuses
on the internal because ignoring it provides impoverished and defective explanations about law.
Compare Clara Sue Kidwell, Systems of Knowledge, in AMERICA IN 1492: THE WoRu.D OF THE
INDIAN PEOPLEs BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE COLUMBUS 369, 394-95 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed.,
1992). Kidwell describes "camay," the act of infusing life spirit into an inanimate object, infusing
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stereotypical expectations to appreciate how customary reasoning works.
These specific cases are illustrative and instructional.
A prototypic situation in tribal courts is a generational dispute involving
child custody or visitation rights. In one case from a CIO/CFR court,
the grandchildren were raised during a substantial period by the grandmother. She desired a visitation right when her daughter became able to
perform her parental role.7" In both the Delaware and Kiowa tribal
ordinances governing the respective parties, the court was unable to find
codified law. The court recognized a mainly orally transmitted custom
and stated: "[T]he court does not hesitate in taking judicial notice of
the unique relationship that exists between Indian grandparents and grandchildren, despite the fact there is no written tribal law on the subject." ' 79
Moving beyond the indigenous custom, the court then looked to external
models.
While the Anglo-American common law historically did not recognize
a grandparent's legal right to visit, the CIO/CFR court noted this principle
had changed. The court considered the state court cases creating such a
right and found that over forty states have enacted statutes providing a
grandparent visitation right.80 Based on its inquiry, the court recognized
and granted the grandmother a visitation right. The court rendered a
decision in accord with acknowledged custom that valued the grandparentgrandchild relationship, as well as the wisdom found in the majority of
the states' policy. This decision exemplifies the productive use of knowledge of Indian custom and Anglo-American law by legal-warriors who
serve as judges.
A similar child-related dispute in the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court points
out the misfit between Anglo-American law and the underlying dispute
that arises from a cultural or custom-based conflict. Here a grandmother
charged that her daughter failed to pay the grandmother for taking care
of the grandchildren."' Though pled as a financial dispute, the underlying
offense or "cultural wrong" was the disrespectful removal of the children
from the grandmother's care without obtaining her proper consent. As
Pommersheim points out, this case cries out for a nonlegal or "culturally
consonant way to mediate the conflict."8 12 This type of dispute is what
alternative dispute resolution traditionally dealt with and can continue
to resolve.
Disputes involving cultural beliefs and a failure to comply with custom
are the subject matter for bodies such as the Peacemaker Court in the
the whole with its essential quality:
It was the power to transform the very essence of material and imbue it with
religious significance, giving it an inner form that was more important than the
outer one. This concern with the inner forces that gave meaning and life to outer
forms was the essence of Native American science.
78. In re C.D.S. & C.M.H., 17 Indian L. Rep. 6083 (Ct. of Indian Offenses for the Delaware
Tribe of Western Okla. 1988).
79. Id. at 6084.
80. Id.
81. Pommersheim, supra note 21, at 62-63.
82. Id. at 62.
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Navajo and Seneca Nations, 3 the Court of Elders in the Sitka Community
Association and the Northwest Intertribal Court System.8 Domestic disputes and interpersonal conflicts are appropriate subject matter even when
personal and property damage occurs. Judgments and verdicts must be
based on concepts accepted by the constituent community. The traditional
retained models of adjudication and alternative dispute resolution focus
upon restitution, not punishment.85 The models of Anglo-American law
focus on determining the guilt of the offender and imposing a punishment.
The concepts of guilt and punishment fail to make 6 amends to all the
affected parties or entities in some tribal situations.
In contrast, nonlegal models provide flexibility to the parties and to
the judicial system. The indigenous preference for restitution can be
accommodated in the remedies and penalties, without restrictions based
on the civil or criminal prosecution dichotomy. The Navajo Peacemaker
Court is part of the judicial system; when parties consent to or seek its
resolution process, the dispute is converted from a criminal matter into
a civil case.87 Even if the matter remains a criminal action, under Navajo
law the court can order punishment for the offender and compensation
for the victim. 8 The criminal code continues the Navajo custom that

83. Tom Tso, The Tribal Court Survives in America, 25 JUDGES J. 22 (1986); Zion, Navajo
Peacemaker, supra note 59, at 96; William Bluehouse Johnson, Navajo Peacemaker Court: Impact
and Efficacy of Traditional Dispute Resolution in the Modern Setting (unpublished J.D. thesis,
University of New Mexico School of Law, 1990). See generally Tso, supra note 44. The Peacemaker
Courts of the Seneca Nation in New York were traditional dispute resolution institutions which
were copied by the Quakers in America. Their jurisdiction was recognized since the mid-19th century
and remains so under Section 46 of the New York State law, and their judgments are to be enforced
by state courts. The law of New York provides for the jurisdiction of the Seneca Peacemaker courts
on three reservations: Allegheny, Cattaraugus and Tonawanda. N.Y. INDIAN LAW art. 4 § 46 (1950).
84. Hepler v. Perkins, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6011, 6016 (Sitka Tribal Ct. 1986). Sitka Court of
Elders determines, under unwritten traditional law of the clans which comprise the Tribe, that
children of female members of a clan cannot be removed from the jurisdiction of the court as

part of the clan's unchangeable responsibility for its children. See NORTHWEST INTERTRIBAL COURT
SYSTEM, supra note 62.
85. See KATHERINE NEWMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 12-17 (1983) (discussing the
classification of law systems into punishment or restitution models).
86. Taylor, supra note 22, at 256: "A stiff money judgment or injunction may not resolve the
issue where the tribal culture puts little value in either. Simply put, Indian judges and juries respond
more readily to concepts and solutions that they can agree will work to solve a problem within
the reservation society." (citing Othole v. Wesley, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 5 at 492 (Zuni Tribal
Ct. 1980) (For the wrongful arrest of a teenage female, a small money judgment was awarded, the
officer responsible was required to publish a public apology and to undergo training in proper
arrest procedures.)).
87. Zion, supra note 71, at 95; Tso, supra note 68, at 227. Once parties consent to the Peacemaker
Court it has authority to enforce attendance through subpoena power. As part of the Navajo Nation
judicial system the Peacemaker Court can use judicial authority to compel the participation of
persons involved in a dispute.
88. Zion, supra note 59, at 273 (citing 17 Navajo Tribal Code § 220, 1191; Ute Mt. Ute Tribe
v. Mills, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6047, 6048 (Ute Ct. App. 1981) (restitution requirement in sentence
did not violate limitations on punishment stated in Indian Civil Rights Act)); see also Tom Tso,
The Tribal Court Survives in America, 25 JUDGES J. 22, 25 (1986) (Navajo Court of Indian Offenses
established in 1903 was not accepted because it only punished wrongdoers and failed to provide
restitution to the people wronged in the community.).
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required the offender to compensate the victim and the clan of the
victim.89
The Sitka Community Association code and the tribal court rules
provide that "at the discretion of the Tribal Court, questions of tribal
custom may be certified to the Court of Elders."' 9 This certification
process follows from other code provisions providing that, absent the
prescription by the code,
. . any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted by
the Court which appears most consistent with the spirit of tribal law.
Where the Court deems appropriate it may determine and apply the
customary law of the Tribe. The Court may refer to other sources
of law for guidance, including the law of other tribes, federal, state
or international. 9'
The Sitka code and rules manifest the importance of the custom of this
sovereign.
Sitka tribal law is a practical approach for a modern tribal court that
integratively use the sources of law serving an indigenous people. Here
the code specifies that the duty of judges is to reach for knowledge
within and without the tribe. 92 Expansive and integrative reach requires
the knowledge which legal-warriors possess.
The integrative approach can use similar procedures and reach results
similar to Anglo-American courts, yet the legal reasoning justifying the
result may differ. The legal knowledge and skill of attorneys is important
in determining what is indigenously distinguished and what will be adapted
from external sources into the tribal common law. For instance, marital
privilege as an evidentiary rule and procedure has endured in state and
federal courts. Some tribal courts have similar evidentiary rules.
When the Navajo Supreme Court considered the marital privilege rule,
it acknowledged borrowing the rule from the federal system. However,
the court rejected one of the historical principles for the marital rule:
that the wife had no separate legal existence from her husband because
a marital unit was one legal party and "the husband was the one." 93
This justification has no support in custom, which the court called
*

89. Zion, Harmony, supra note 59, at 273 (citing Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law, I1
MUSEUM NOTES 37 (1938)).

90. Hepler, 13 Indian L. Rep. at 6013.
91. Id.

92. Other tribes have similar provisions for external models and adoptions. E.g., Colville Con-

federated Tribes v. Bush, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6123, 6124 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1990) (tribal code allows
court to adopt state law offering more protection to criminal defendant than the tribal provision).
In the absence of dispositive legislation, courts may look to tribal custom and tradition:

Where doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the tribe, the Court shall

request the address of Tribal Councilors familiar with Tribal Customs and usages.
Where appropriate, the laws of the State of South Dakota may be employed to
determine civil matters. The laws of the State of South Dakota shall not be used
as a substitute for existing tribal laws.
Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work, supra note 9, at 453 n.161 (citing SISSETONWAHPETON TRIBAL CODE ch. 3, § 1 (1982)).
93. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6035 (Navajo 1988).
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"Navajo tradition and culture." The Navajo world is a matrilineal and
matrilocal society in which the woman's role is revered. 94 Important
matters in Navajo society, including individual status, identity, and some
rights to property and productive sheep herds, derive from the mother
and her clan. The Navajo Supreme Court then found cultural accord
with the Anglo-American principle to preserve the harmony and sanctity
of the marriage relationship and denied the marital privilege in this case.
Sometimes customary tribal law will produce results different from an
Anglo-American court's determination because the substantive law arises
from a fundamentally different view on the matter at issue. In the use
of tribal trust lands and in probate distribution of property there is an
important difference. The Anglo-American concept of property as individualized ownership and exploitation is not germane. The American
Indian custom of stewardship and practice of common ownership and
benefits prevail over individualistic entitlements.
For instance, for agricultural permits and land, Navajo law uses the
customary trust. This is "a unique Navajo innovation which requires the
appointment of a trustee to hold the productive property for the benefit
of the family unit." 95 Custom and the Navajo policy of avoiding unproductive fragmenting of agricultural land on the tribal lands determined
the outcome. The customary usage interest in the Navajo nation's land
was awarded to the heir in "the best position to make proper and
beneficial use of the land." 96 This decision also involved the critical
American Indian belief that communal lands cannot be owned. The
Navajos and other tribes, through custom and express law, have established possessory interests that are recognized and inherited.
In the Navajo probate system, fairness among the heirs is achieved
through custom. In the customary interest case, the heirs were denied
an equal portion of the possessory land interest at issue and received
other property from the estate. 97 In another probate case, the Navajo
Supreme Court relied on the custom that parents should "view" each
of their children equally. 98 Each of the children was treated equally in
accordance with the common benefit custom which regards family and
clan members as one economic unit. The family and clan "camp" keeps
the productive goods while the unproductive goods are distributed among
the decedent's immediate family and relatives. 99
A critical difference that distinguishes the custom underlying tribal law
from Anglo-American law is the definition of the immediate family and
the role of extended family. Issues arising in the context of tribal domestic

94. Id. at 6036. Compare Southern Puget Sound Intertribal Hous. Auth. v. Carl Johnson, Jr.,
No. SHO-CIV 6/80-434, slip. op. (Shoalwater Bay App. Ct. Sept. 24, 1988) (Parol evidence rule
does not apply to proceedings in tribal court because it is fundamental to tribal culture that parties
to a conflict have their say without legal doctrines unfairly limiting such a right.).
95. In re Charley Nez Wauneka, Sr., 13 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6050 (Navajo 1986).
96. Id. at 6049.
97. Id. at 6051.
98. In re Joe Thomas, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6053, 6054 (Navajo 1988).
99. Id.at 6053.
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relations, child custody, and probate cases, include definitions of family
and role broader than the definitions in Anglo-American law. 1°0 Tribal
cases uniformly recognize that the extended family is a customary definition with legal consequences for those within the expansive unit of a
family or clan. Customary definitions are also evident in law created
outside the tribal court.
2. Federal Indian Law and Custom
Federal Indian law already accommodates customary concepts based
on indigenous belief and preference for restitution. Different legal standards and burdens upon the litigants accompany the legal definitions in
Indian law. For instance, recognition of the substantive difference exists
in the tort law standards in the CIO/CFR regulations. While binding on
these courts, the tort standard has also been adopted by some tribally
authorized courts. The standard for the defendant's conduct is "carelessness" rather than negligence.' 0' The standard allows the judge and
jury to decide whether the defendant's conduct appeared careless under
the circumstances without requiring a focused determination of elements
02
such as duty and the standard of care the defendant owes.1
The carelessness standard rule allows the judge and jury to use the
expansive viewpoint that is common among American Indians. The intent
of the promulgator of the tort regulation is not clear, but the usage is
culturally compatible for American Indians. The parties, their environment
when the charged misconduct occurred, and other cultural elements come
into the consideration of the defendant's conduct. Some tribally authorized
courts expressly use custom which precludes Anglo-American tort concepts

100. E.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6105
(Navajo 1990) (employer nepotism policy denying jobs to "relatives by marriage" but allowing jobs
to "blood relations" is discriminatory where marriage is central in Navajo custom of extended
family and clan relations); Graybeal v. Alaska, 17 Indian L. Rep. 2206 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished
opinion) (custom of Athabascan Natives of Native Village of Northway requires relatives to assume
responsibility "for the care and nurture of children when the children's natural parents are ...
unavailable"); Wike v. Tarasiewicz, 14 Indian L. Rep. 6020 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct. 1987)
(rejecting comity for state court order changing custody when child's welfare and interest of tribe
is in maintaining father's custody which provides benefits of extended family network). Compare
In re Baby Girl D.S., 600 A.2d 71 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991) (court's consideration of grandparents'
relationship with child is improper under statute regarding termination of parental rights). It is
inconceivable that a tribally authorized or CIO/CFR court would hear a case such as Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) in which the local government prohibited a
grandmother from living with her grandchildren as this violated the zoning ordinance's definition
of immediate family. Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work, supra note 9, at 438,
discusses the relational fabric of tribal life and law, inseparably manifest in "the legal decision
whether to grant 'standing' in a custody dispute to a member of the extended family or 'tiyospaye'
who is neither the mother nor the father of the child." "Tiyospaye" is the Lakota (Sioux) word
for extended family. See Moran v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6106 (Rosebud Sioux
Ct. App. 1991) (injunction modified so defendant and children could visit grandmother, in accord
with "tiyospaye").
101. 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.501(b)) ("Where the injury
inflicted was the result of carelessness of the defendant, the judgment shall fairly compensate the
injured party for the loss he or she has suffered."). See Zion, supra note 59, at 277-79, for a
discussion of this standard in tort as one area for the development of Indian common law.
102. 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.501(b)).
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and defenses such as contributory or comparative negligence.' 3 Precluding
these defenses allows a broader view of what occurred and who was
injured in the particular instance. A broader view is generally not permitted
in Anglo-American law because the tort elements are restrictively defined.
However, this expanded universe of the parties or persons with interests
at stake befits the shared viewpoint of life held by many native peoples,
that humans are in relationships with the earth and all living forms, not
just human beings. The permissibility of the American Indian expansive
view is confirmed in the federal tort regulation's provision for liability
when injury is deliberately inflicted. When such liability is determined,
"the judgment shall impose an additional penalty upon the defendant,
which additional penalty may run either in favor of the injured party
or in favor of the tribe."'' ° The remedies in the tort regulation free the
tribal courts to consider community standards of the tribe in the determination of the penalty. 05
Judicial freedom in the use of customary law provides the advantages
of invention. The tribal courts can be accountable to the community and
its customs in a way that is not available in Anglo-American law. The
creation of law based on indigenous custom and appropriate AngloAmerican law sources ultimately distinguishes the tribal courts of the
third sovereign.
III.

TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW: THE ENGINE FOR
INNOVATIVE LAW

The use of custom in tribal jurisprudence, codified and common law,
with the appropriate Anglo-American law concepts produces synergistic
results, rather than a laminate with discrete layers. While elegant integration of diverse legal concepts is an accomplishment in itself, that is
not the primary benefit of tribal law. Of most value is the creative
capacity of tribal courts, shown through the work of legal-warriors who
use the old to make new and appropriate law. The law produced in
tribal codes and courts does not necessarily retain the discrete elements
from Anglo-American legal culture with the same meaning and value as
in the contributor culture or jurisprudence. In both the tribal law and
the concept of the legal-warrior, there is an innovative result that is

103. Taylor, supra note 22, at 240 (citing Makah Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 447
(Wash. 1968) (state court to recognize and enforce tribal custom)). Compare Howard v. Sharp, 10
Indian L. Rep. 6027, 6028 (Colo. River Tribal Ct. 1983) (comparative negligence standard adopted
by tribal court), with Boren v. Victorino, No. 12-ATC-7940 (Acoma Pueblo Tribal Ct., May 14,
1980) (contributory negligence not a part of the customary law of the Pueblo and would not bar
plaintiff's recovery).
However, CIO/CFR courts using the federal code, rather than a tribal code, can similarly treat
accidental and contributory causes. See 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R.
§ 11.501(d)). "Where the injury was inflicted as the result of accident, or where both the complainant
and the defendant were at fault, the judgment may compensate the injured party for a reasonable
part of the loss he or she has suffered." Id.
104. 58 Fed. Reg. 54,406 (1993) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11.501(c)).
105. Zion, Harmony, supra note 59, at 278.
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consistent with a pervasive characteristic of the indigenous nations: the
capacity to change as an evolving culture.
Indeed, adaptation and change are pervasive in the accounts of the
indigenous peoples of the Americas, as they were before the Columbian
and European invasion and as they have persisted.106 Iverson has described
the pattern of living as one which embraced both conservation and
innovation.
They had to balance the duty to live in the proper way and conserve
the good of the past with the need to incorporate changes that could
ensure the continuity of one's people. If they borrowed certain elements
from other societies, they could make such additions their own over
time. And over a still more extended period these innovations could
become 1 well
enough embedded in the culture to be considered tra07
ditional.
For people whose principle beliefs and conduct were attuned to nature,
the environment, and seasonal factors, adaptability was key to physical
survival and cultural continuity. The introduction of European nations
and their political power, technology, animal and plant life also challenged
the tribal nations' ability to conserve, yet evolve with the new. The
resistance to the European powers' domination was accompanied by
adoption, adaptation, and, ultimately, appropriation of some technology,
life forms, and governmental concepts. The three "A's" of adoption,
adaptation, and appropriation provided the process used by indigenous
peoples to resolve the tension between conservation and innovation.
In the common pattern, adoption occurred because of obvious utilitarian
value; yet adaptation followed with the fine tuning for the specific
indigenous people's needs and the environment; and, finally, a state of
complete acceptance, appropriation, took place. For example, the Spanish
introduced the "civilizing" power of the Catholic Church as well as
sheep, goats, horses, and cattle to the Navajos. While rejecting the
Catholic Church as a dominant force, the Navajos adopted and used
these four life forms to "redefine themselves."'' 0 The economic benefit
of sheep was furthered through adaptation; breeding the type of sheep
most productive in the Navajo environment and finding new uses for
their products./°9 Ultimately, in appropriation, Navajo weaving became
a distinct cultural art form with important cultural value. In telling how
these life forms reached them, the Navajos make no mention of the

106. See generally ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970); Kidwell,
supra note 77, at 369, 374 (comparing European science which focuses on similarities of things and
natural order with, the importance native peoples attach to the unusual, the mutable or changeable).
107. Peter Iverson, Taking Care of the Earth and Sky, in AMERCA: 1492: THE WORLD OF THE
INDIAN PEOPLES BEFORE THE ARIVAL OF COLUMBUS 85, 107 (Alvin M. Josephy Jr. ed., 1992).
108. Peter Iverson, The Navajos After 1492: A Perspective on Native Peoples and Cultural
Change, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (Clyde Milner & Carol O'Conner eds.,
forthcoming 1994) [hereinafter Iverson, The Navajos After 1492]. See generally PETER IVERSON, THE
NAVAJO NATION (1981).
109. See also Kidwell, supra note 77, at 396, on the selective control of the environment by the
Indians of the Americas through breeding as well as the use of fire and water.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Spanish origins. Incorporated into the cultural story of the Navajo people,
these animals are gifts from the gods."I 0
When cultural appropriation occurs, the meaning and value is no longer
that of the donor culture. For indigenous peoples, the meaning goes
beyond the utilitarian and the factual. The meaning becomes part of the
people's creation story. Empowerment arises from a relationship with the
spirits that accompany the animate and inanimate. The Quechua Indians
of the Andes engaged in "camay," an act in which life spirit was infused
into an inanimate object."' Kidwell relates camay to the Navajo concept
of "inner forms."" 2 Both acts involve using "the power to transform
the very essence of material and imbue it with religious significance,
giving it an inner form that was more important than the outer one."" 3
Another dramatic example of the innovative and transforming power
is provided by the horse. Beyond immediate utilitarian acceptance, Navajo
adaptation then allowed individuals to achieve status via the aesthetics
and skill of horsemanship. Ultimately, the Navajos embraced the horse
as an empowering symbol tied to the critical forces of the four directions
of the universe. " 4 Hence, the turquoise horse of the south, a transformation that added joy and power to the Navajo:
The turquoise horse prances with me.
From where we start the turquoise horse is seen.
The lightening flashes from the turquoise horse.
The turquoise horse is terrifying.
He stands on the upper circle of the rainbow.
The sunbeam is in his mouth for a bridle.
He circles around all the people of the earth
With their goods.
Today he is on my side.
And I shall win with him.'
Thus, we see the horse in its final appropriation: a turquoise form
embodied in myth which empowers the believers beyond their present
circumstances. This ability to conserve and innovate through empowering
transformation has remained critical to indigenous peoples. As they resisted the dominating power of the Europeans and Euro-Americans, the

110. PETER IVERSON, THa NAVAJO NATION 4-5 (1981) ("Since time immemorial our grandfathers
and our grandmothers have lived from their herds-from their herds of sheep, horses and cattle,
for those things originated with the world itself.") (quoting Buck Austin, We Have Lived on
Livestock a Lang Time, in NAVAJo HISTORICAL SELECTIONS 62 (Robert W. Young & William Morgan
eds., 1954)).
111. Kidwell, supra note 77, at 394-395.
112. Id. at 396.
113. Id. at 395.
114. Iverson, The Navajos After 1492, supra note 108, at 4-5.
115. Id. at 5. See generally LAVERNE HARREL CLARK, THEY SANG FOR HORSES: THE IMPACT OF
THE HORSE ON NAVAJO AND APACHE FOLKLORE (1966) and JOHN C. EWERS, THE HORSE IN BLACKFOOT
INDIAN CULTURE (1955) for details and consequences of the transformation of native cultures through
the interplay of conservation and innovation. For example, the efficacy of horses freed the time
and imagination of native peoples so that arts and crafts flourished and the Horse Medicine beliefs
and practices developed.
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same ability was used to transform tribal governments and laws with the
appropriate use of the concepts of governance.
To survive in the United States, the tribal nations struggled to maintain
a distinct national identity, operate with economic independence and
sufficiency, and retain political self-determination. This ongoing struggle
has severely tested the adaptive insights and skills of native peoples. The
United States republic changed from its initial nation-to-nation relationship
with tribes. The United States embarked on cyclical federal policies to
exterminate Indians through warfare and acculturation and policies that
in varying degrees respected and protected tribal sovereignty. Using their
own governmental concepts and structures and those borrowed from the
European cultures, the indigenous nations continuously transformed their
governments and their judicial components.
In the period when national and state citizens, greedy for the tribal
lands, pushed for removal of the indigenous peoples, numerous tribes
realistically recognized the threat to their survival and continuity. For
instance, in 1819-1829, the Cherokees deliberately engaged in a renascence
of their political and economic power. Their National Council recognized
the task to counter the white society's view of them as primitive people,
not fit to govern themselves nor entitled to respect for their title and
governance of tribal lands.
They [Cherokees] had to keep written records. They had to study the
white man's laws-how they were made and how they were interpreted,
how they were enforced or not enforced. Then they had to appropriate
these lessons to their own needs. In the most critical areas of revitalization the Cherokees were self-taught. The white man's government
and practices provided the tools for the Cherokee renascence, but the
Cherokees had to learn how to use them for themselves." 6
While selectively borrowing from the white man's culture, the Cherokees
retained a conservation viewpoint. Underlying their efforts was a refusal
to be integrated into the United States republic and the goal to retain
7
a separate national existence with their own laws and government."
The Cherokees transformed the structure of their government between
1820 and 1830. They produced a centralized government with a bicameral
legislature, a distinct and superior court system, an elective system of
representation by geographical districts, and a salaried government bu-

116. WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 277 (1986). See
generally Strickland, supra note 30. The cultural exchange included adoption of societal practices
with ultimately destructive force, e.g., the use of Afro-Americans as property and slaves. The postCivil War land and power losses inflicted upon the Five Civilized Tribes were significantly affected
by each tribe's resistance to fairly treat or provide citizenship to their freed slaves. See id. at 79102 (covering laws to prevent marriages between Cherokees and "Negro" slaves and denying citizenship
and inheritance rights to children of illegal unions). See generally Arrel M. Gibson, Constitutional
Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 17 (1974); ANGLE DEBO, AND STIL
THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CrILIzED TtuEs (1940).
117. McLOUGHitN, supra note 116, at 308, 325; STRICKLAND, supra note 30, at 183 ("A unique
intermingling of newly written laws and the ancient spiritual culture emerged.").
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reaucracy." 5 While the changes were unwelcome by some traditionals
within the tribe, at times the governmental structure was recognized as
legitimate by the dominant Anglo world and thus insulated against invasions of the Cherokee's sovereignty. 119
Other tribes experienced the introduction of governmental concepts and
selectively used them to transform their governments for self-directed
benefit and as a defense against the aggressions of a land acquisitive
white society. 120 While accepting some external concepts, certain customary
beliefs and usages, particularly the communal ownership of tribal lands,
remained as fundamental and unchangeable. In other areas, the innovation
produced benefits which the white majority society would later adopt,
e.g., the Creek Nation's constitutional and legal reform of 1859 provided
12
Creek women with complete control and ownership of their property.
The Cherokee and Creek constitutions provided eighteen year old males
with the right to vote; the Chickasaws provided this right to nineteen
year old males. 2 2 Tribal views of this nature clearly differed with the
non-Indian world's with regard to who was competent to enjoy the benefits
of full citizenship.
The acceptance and use of nonindigenous legal concepts is part of the
continuity upon which tribal people have always focused. The adoption,

118. McLouoHLIN, supra note 116, at 284. These innovations were not adopted without Cherokee
concern for the loss of customary institutions so as to become simply a copy of white society.
Among the Cherokee, the conflicts about the degree of innovation eventually erupted into intratribal
warfare. After removal to the western lands was ordered and enforced by the federal government
through the historical "Trail of Tears," some distraught resistive "traditionals" killed the assimilationist leaders who tried to bargain with the federal government. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY
OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 120-28 (1970).
However, the conserving and innovating power used in the renascence of the Cherokee constitutional
and legal system continues in the present day government led by Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller.
In Fall, 1991 the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma reestablished its tribal courts in the historic Cherokee
Courthouse after legal decisions established that the tribe's judicial power had not been extinguished
through the Allotment Acts and policies.
119. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Supreme Court affirmed t4e murder conviction
of an Indian where sentence imposed by courts of the Cherokee Nation was sufficiently patterned
after Anglo-American models and used a written criminal code.). This decision was made in the
same period when the federal government was disassembling tribal governments through the allotment
policy and imposing CIO/CFR courts upon tribes.
120. See, e.g., Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 17 (1974); ANGIE DEO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN (1940); PETER IVERSON, THE
NAVAJO NATION (1981) (providing an account of the evolution and experiences of Navajo government);
MARY SHEPARDSON, NAVAJO WAYS IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN POLITICAL PROCESS (American
Anthropological Ass'n Memoirs No. 96, 1963) (covering the earliest historical periods through 1960
in Navajo government evolution).
121. ANGIE DEao, THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE 125-26, 305-08 (1984). Debo described the cultural
confusion during the forced allotment of tribal lands under the Allotment Act Commission scheme
which allocated land 160 acres for male "head of a family," with smaller amounts to unmarried
men and children.
[Tihe Indians expressed so much opposition to this alien 'head of a family' conceptin their society married women and children had property rights-that in 1891 the
[Allotment] act was amended to provide equal shares to all-80 acres of agricultural,
160 acres of grazing land. These amounts were subsequently modified in agreements
made with different tribes.
ANGIE DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 300 (1970).
122. Gibson, supra note 30, at 30, 32, & 38.
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adaptation, and appropriation process can explain the transformations in
tribal law. The Navajo Supreme Court's decision in Navajo Nation v.
Murphy about marital privilege allows a dialogue between that judicial
system and other jurisdictions. 23 Yet the decision remains anchored in
a custom that values the power of matrilineal and matrilocal relationships
in a fundamentally different way than other tribal nations,' 24 the states,
and the federal law. The inner substance is different from the external
form, which appears similar to the decision in a nontribal jurisdiction
to deny the use of marital privilege because of an insufficient factual
basis.
The undeniable difference of tribal law must be explicitly recognized
in any dialogue with federal and state sovereigns which professes to value
American Indian jurisprudence.
Tribal courts do not exist solely to reproduce or replicate the dominant
cannon appearing in state and federal courts. If they did, the process
of colonization would be complete and the unique legal cultures of
the tribes fully extirpated. Nevertheless, tribal legal cultures-given
even the most benign view of Indian-non-Indian history-also do not
reflect pre-Columbian tribal standards and norms. This is because
there has always been a unique legal reality created25 by tribal resistance
to the process of colonization and assimilation.
What Pommersheim calls the "riprap" of the historical forces provides
opportunity for tribal courts and the legal-warriors to generate a unique
jurisprudence.' 26 As the specific concerns and customs of the different
tribal nations are addressed in tribal law and courts,
the creative capacities
27
of the third sovereign continue to be tested.
That creative capacity makes the American Indian courts the laboratories
for new concepts that can benefit the majority judicial system. Tribal
court innovation is akin to the American political concept that states are
the laboratories for national political change. 21 Vine Deloria, Jr., in 1965
argued "that tribes are not vestiges of the past, but laboratories of the
future."''29 Tribal courts are the premier part of the indigenous nation's
laboratory.

123. Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6035 (Navajo 1988). See supra text accompanying
notes 93-94.
124. Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal sovereignty and immunity
permit ordinance denying tribal membership to children of female members who marry outside the
tribe, while providing membership to children of male members who marry outside the tribe).
125. Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work, supra note 9, at 420-21.
126. Id. at 421.
127. The assimilationist approach to American Indian governments and courts remains a continuous
force, changed maybe as to form but not intent. See Kirke Kickingbird, "In Our Image ... After
Our Likeness:" The Drive for the Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
675 (1976).
128. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating value of states as laboratories for legal innovation).
129. To Protect the Constitutional Rights of American Indians, 1965: Hearings on S. 961, S.
962, S. 963, S. 964, S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1965)
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CONCLUSION
Tribes persist as the third sovereign within the United States' borders,
exercising power over individuals as do the state and federal sovereigns.
The over 500 tribes are increasingly exercising their power to govern;
their executive, legislative, and judicial actions affect subject matter important to members and to nonmembers. In tribal interactions with
nonmembers and with state and federal governments, the tribal courts
are the key branch where the lawmaking of the indigenous nations is
tested.
The use of custom, in code and especially in common law, is the
increasing pattern in tribal court decisions. Using customary beliefs and
usage to make law is not unique as a process. What does distinguish
tribal common law is the cultural perspective underlying those customary
beliefs. A world view focused upon collective values, where nature is
part of the community, presents different principles upon which to decide
the recurring disputes among members. More than individual victims are
considered when the restoration of harmony and balance is the objective.
The tribal courts affirm and sustain cultural values, thus generating law
that is appropriate and that is legitimated by fairness in procedure and
result. The legitimacy of the tribal courts and their distinctive law is
manifest in more than the structure and operation of the courts by trained

(statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., Executive Director of the National Congress of American Indians):
[M]uch has been made of the so-called transitional nature of tribal government.
We feel that tribal groups are indeed in transition, but to a new form of social
understanding, which if understood by other people, would help solve some of the
pressing social problems of today. We suggest that tribes are not vestiges of the
past, but laboratories of the future. As we see the larger society beginning to adopt
Indian social forms, we feel impelled to suggest that tribes be allowed maximum
flexibility, in developing their own economic, political, and human resources so
that they might bring the best of the Indian understanding of life to the rest of
this country.
See also Resnik, supra note 8, at 757:
An 'other' sovereign serves a valuable purpose for the federal government. The
degree of toleration of the 'other' sovereign's decisions enables the federal government
to make plain what its own values are. One version of this relationship is the
'laboratory' that Brandeis described-in which the states are places of experimentation. An alternative conception is the dialectic interaction that Robert Cover and
Alexander Alienikoff mapped. If one believes in the utility of that dialogue, then
one would be supportive of enabling two voices, of cohabitation rather than
domination, of having governments with different 'interests' and 'ideology' thus
enabling innovation.
(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Robert
M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L. J. 1035 (1977); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981)).
For contemporary views on the states as laboratories, see DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF
DEMOCRACY: A NEW BREED OF GOVERNOR CREATES MODELS FOR NATIONAL GROWTH 3 (1990). "Part
of the beauty, as Brandeis pointed out, is that new ideas can be tested on a limited scale-to see
if they work, and to see if they sell-before they are imposed on the entire nation." The Indian
nations provide a range of limited scale governments, from small Alaskan Villages where population
is measured in the hundreds to the larger nations such as the Navajos and the Oklahoma Cherokees
whose populations, landbase, and governmental complexity are comparable to many city, county,
and state entities.
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judges, attorneys, and personnel. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the tribal
courts rests on decisions that show concern for justice.
In diverse areas such as family relations, probate, tort, and criminal
prosecutions the selected tribal court cases show that customary principles
can produce jurisprudence entitled to respect by tribal members and
outsiders. From the small tribal courts to the complex system of the
Navajos, customary law has the potential to "transform the present by
integrating the best of the past with a liberating view of the possibilities
of the future."' 30 This transformational power, using principles from
Anglo-American law where appropriate, is the strength of tribal common
law.
This innovative power allows the tribal courts to serve as a laboratory
for national jurisprudence in the United States. Certainly this creative
power is critical for the continuity of tribal nations as modern governments
meeting the needs of their members. It is important that non-Indians
learn about the tribal customary law, if for no other reason than to
prevent the Anglo-American world from prescribing for tribal societies
how their laws should be made. The innovative power of tribal jurisprudence, which long ago discovered alternative dispute resolution methods, can continue to provide direct benefit to non-Indian sovereigns and
their citizens. Enriching and reciprocal potential exists; it is only a matter
of whether the non-Indian world is ready to learn and appreciate the
customary wisdom in tribal common law.

130. Pommersheim, supra note 10, at 393.

